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Abstract
In this paper, we try to assess if financial incentives may be used as an effective device
to induce workers to postpone retirement by evaluating the Italian so called “super bonus”
reform. The bonus consisted in economic incentives given for a limited period to private sector
workers who had reached the requirements for seniority pension but who chose to postpone
retirement. Crucially for this study, public workers were not entitled to the bonus. Using
data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth, and exploiting the DID-
Probit strategy proposed by Blundell et al. (JEEA, 2004), we assess the effect of the bonus on the
decision to postpone retirement, by comparing private and public workers before and after the
reform. Results suggest a reduction of 12ppt in the proportion of private workers who decided
to retire among those qualifying for retirement. Results also suggest, not trivially, that most of
the effect of the reform is driven by low-income workers. Finally, we propose an estimate of
the extensive margin elasticity of Italian older workers.
1 Introduction
In the recent years, there has been increasing interest among both economists
and policy makers in the possible consequences of population ageing, and
in particular on how to make the social security system more sustainable
in light of this. Among the many developments arisen from this interest,
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one developed within the literature on optimal taxation, and in particu-
lar within the Mirrlees optimal tax model. Under this model the optimal
marginal tax rate at a particular income depends on the hazard rate of the
income distribution, the elasticity of labour supply and the distribution
of skills (Diamond, 2008). As old workers, like the young, have both high
hazard rates and elastic labour supply relative to prime age workers, there
is scope for age-related taxation.
Even before considering the potential benefits of age-related taxation,
however, one should probably question the adequacy of pension systems.
On this issue, a number of works show that there are strong implicit and
explicit incentives to leave the labour market embedded in the pension
systems of most developed economies.
First of all, the different labour market participation of old and young in-
dividuals has been noticed. D’Addio et al. (2010), for example, show that
in OECD countries older workers (50-64) are less likely to be in employ-
ment than their prime-aged counterparts (aged 25-50), with high cross-
country variability. At one extreme, there are countries like Japan and
United States where older participation rates is over 70 per cent; at the
other extreme there are countries, including Italy, where older participa-
tion rate is below 50 per cent.
Data show that older workers participation rate is higher now than in the
seventies, but the authors suggest that this is mainly driven by increased
labour force participation of women. Thus, the higher participation rate
of older workers is due to catching up of women rather than to a trend
towards increased older workers participation. Despite this, a sizeable
gap in participation rates of older workers still persists, with Italy among
the countries where the gap is larger.
Besides, in most OECD countries workers tend to leave the labour mar-
ket before the pensionable age. Italy was the country with the lowest pen-
sionable age for workers who retired in 2006 and one of the countries with
the lowest average effective age of labour-market exit in the period 2002-07
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(57 and 60 years respectively, for both men and women).
Some authors tried to provide estimates of the unused productive ca-
pacity of older workers in specific age ranges as a percentage of the total
labour capacity at that same age range. Gruber and Wise (1999) calculated
that in Italy the proportion of unused productive capacity in the 55-65 age
range was almost 60% in 1996, one of the highest among the countries con-
sidered by the authors.1 More recent results from the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (Borsch-Supan et al., 2005) show that
there is potentially huge unused labour capacity of healthy individuals in
some countries. In Italy, for example, 50% of Italian healthy respondents
above 55 were not in the labour force.2
There is now a lot of evidence explaining why this is happening and
describing the incentives to leave the labour market embedded in the pen-
sion system. First, analysts who have recently examined cross-national
differences in pension incentives generally find they have predictable and
significant effects on labor force withdrawal (Gruber and Wise, 1999). Sec-
ond, countries with early pension ages, generous income replacement, and
heavy implicit taxes on earnings in old age tend to have earlier exit from
the labor force than countries with pension systems that provide fewer
work disincentives (Burtless, 2004).
The incentives to leave the labour market embedded in pension systems
have been measured in various ways. The level of pension wealth, defined
as the discounted present value of the lifetime flow of pension benefits,
may be important but what is crucial is the change in pension wealth. The
change in pension wealth measured between two consecutive periods is
called one-year accrual. The literature on the “option value” of retirement,
however, has shown that an even better measure of the incentive to retire
should take into account all future wealth accruals.
1The countries with the lowest and highest unused productive capacity were Japan
(22%) and Belgium (67%), respectively.
2In particular, 21.5% of good health individuals in the 50-60 age range are retired and
not working; this percentage reaches 69.3% for individuals above 60 years.
4
Probably the most striking estimate of effects of the implicit social se-
curity tax on earned income was uncovered by a group of international
economists, coordinated by Gruber and Wise (1999). The authors com-
pared labour force withdrawal rates of older workers with the accrual
from keeping working an additional year. Italy was one of the countries
with the highest implicit taxes together with the highest withdrawal rates.
Of course this evidence, even if suggestive of a possible causal rela-
tionship, can not be interpreted as a causal effect of pension incentives
on retirement. However, a number of works try to uncover exactly this
type of relationship. Alessie and Belloni (2009), for example, use a quasi-
reduced form of the option-value model on Italian data and find that fi-
nancial incentives do in fact have a strong effect on retirement: the change
in financial incentives experienced by workers when they become eligible
for pension determines a 30 percentage points increase in their retirement
probability.
In general, the great majority of the available evidence points in this di-
rection 3. This is quite surprising, in light of the well-documented issue of
increasing risk of non-sustainability of pension systems around the world.
Rather, one would probably expect the diffusion of incentives to induce
older workers to delay retirement. This raise a question which is of course
important for policy reasons: are incentives to postpone retirement as ef-
fective as those embedded in pension systems that induce workers to retire
early?
In this paper, we will try to answer this question. We will evaluate the so
called “super bonus” reform, implemented between 2004 and 2007 in Italy
and involving financial incentives directed to older workers who decided
to delay seniority retirement. A difference-in-differences strategy will al-
low us to interpret the results causally. Besides, we will exploit a new ap-
proach to diff-in-diffs estimation in probit models proposed by Blundell
3See, among the others, the series of papers on within countries, micro-econometric
analysis coordinated by Gruber and Wise (2004).
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et al. (2004) which accounts for the fact that the marginal effects on inter-
action terms cannot give a difference-in-differences measure analogous to
the coefficients from a linear model. Finally, we will relate the change in
participation to the change in the financial incentives to retire implied by
the reform to get a taste of individuals’ response to monetary incentives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section II, we briefly describe
the Italian institutional setting and in particular the characteristics of the
“super bonus” reform. In section III, we describe the data and provide
some descriptive statistics on retirement in Italy and on the characteris-
tics of our sample of workers. In section IV, we describe the estimation
strategy and in section V we show our results. In Section VI we relate the
change in participation to financial incentives changes. Section VII con-
cludes.
2 The “Super Bonus” Reform
Italy underwent three major reforms of the social security system in the
nineties, with the aim of increasing the financial sustainability of the sys-
tem.4 The main features of the reforms were an increase in the retirement
age and minimum years of contributions for pension eligibility, the grad-
ual passage from a defined benefit system towards a contribution based
system, indexation of pension benefits to prices rather than to wages and
the introduction of complementary social security. Besides, they abolished
seniority pensions for all those who started working after 1995, where se-
niority pension in Italy consists in the possibility of early retirement for
workers who possess a minimum number of years of contributions.
These three main reforms were followed by other minor measures up
until the Maroni reform of 2004. The aim of this reform was twofold: first
of all, increasing retirement age, mainly on voluntary basis, and second
the development of complementary social security next to the usual public
4Riforma Amato in 1992, riforma Dini in 1995 and riforma Prodi in 1997.
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social security system. It provided also for further increases in pensionable
age and contribution requirements and was partly modified in 2007.
It should be mentioned that in 2011, given the persistence of the Ital-
ian financial problems, a new reform of the pension system (the so called
“Fornero” reform) intervened in order to accelerate the effects of previ-
ous reforms. In particular, it introduced the contribution based system for
everybody starting from 2012, further tightened age requirements for old
age pension and the definitive abrogation of seniority pension 5.
The focus of this study will be on the so called “super bonus”, which
was indeed part of the 2004 reform, to study its effect on the decision to
delay retirement. The bonus consisted in economic incentives, given for
a limited period (2004-2007) to private workers who had reached the age
and contribution requirements necessary for seniority pension. The bonus
was directed to private sector workers who had reached seniority pension
requirements in between October 2004 and the end of 2007 (but who had
not reached requirements for old age pension yet6) and who chose to con-
tinue working. Crucially for our study, public workers were not entitled
to the bonus. The age and contribution requirements in the reform years
were the same for both public and private workers and for both men and
women and amounted to either 57 years together with 35 years of con-
tributions or 38/39 years of contributions independently from age. The
effects of the bonus ceased either voluntarily if the worker decided to re-
tire, or compulsorily by reaching old age pension requirements or with the
end of 2007. After this date, the worker could decide to continue working
with no incentives, thus going back to the pre-bonus compensation net of
social security contributions.
The amount of the incentive to postpone retirement corresponded to the
pension contributions that the employers normally pay to the social secu-
rity system and that they had now to pay directly to the employees who
5Actually, seniority pension was substituted by early retirement, with similar charac-
teristics but stronger requirements in terms of years of contributions.
6Old age pension requirements consisted of 65 years for men and 60 years for women.
7
applied for the bonus. The gross salary increase then amounted to the
salary fraction normally devoted to social security contributions, that is
32.70% for most workers (33.70% on earnings above 37,884 Euro). Clearly,
this implies that in absolute terms the incentive increased as the gross
salary increased, but the percentage increase with respect to gross earn-
ings was almost constant among different earners.
However, as the extra salary was untaxed and due to the progressivity of
labour income taxes, the percentage increase with respect to net earnings
was even bigger than the nominal contributions value as it increased more
than proportionally with net earnings. An example will help visualizing
the implications of the incentive (see Table 1): a worker earning a gross
yearly salary of 20,000 Euro would earn a net salary of 15,153 Euro with no
incentive and of 21,693 Euro with the incentive, while at the other extreme
one individual earning a gross salary of 100,000 Euro would earn 56,813
Euro with no incentive and 90,134 Euro with the incentive, meaning that
for this individual the increase exceeds 60% of the net salary, versus a 43%
increase for the former worker.
As the worker was not contributing anymore to his own pension during
the three years of incentives, the pension she was entitled to remained
fixed to the level cumulated up until the moment she joined the super
bonus (it was only increased by cost of living adjustments). Related to
this, it should be also taken into account that every working year with
no incentive determines a pension increase equal to 2% of last working
years average salary, percentage that progressively decreases to 0.90% for
salaries above the 37,884 Euro pensionable limit. This is an additional
reason making the incentive more convenient for high-income workers.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The data I will use to investigate the super bonus effects on retirement
decisions are taken from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income
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Table 1: The Size of the Incentive by Earnings
Gross
Earnings
After Tax
Earnings
without
Incentive
After Tax
Earnings
with
Incentive
Difference
Difference
as
proportion
of net
earnings
20,000 15,153 21,693 6,540 43.16
30,000 20,752 30,562 9,810 47.27
40,000 26,295 39,396 13,101 49.82
50,000 31,358 47,829 16,471 52.53
60,000 36,557 56,398 19,841 54.27
70,000 41,921 65,132 23,211 55.37
80,000 47,165 73,746 26,581 56.36
100,000 56,813 90,134 33,321 58.65
Own calculations based on Ipsoa, 2004
and Wealth (SHIW), as to our knowledge this is the only dataset that in-
cludes information on both private and public workers and on the number
of years of contributions. The SHIW started in the 1960s, it is realized ap-
proximately every two years and microdata are available starting from the
1977 survey. Up to 1987 the survey was conducted with time-independent
samples (cross sections) of households but since 1989 part of the sample
has comprised also households interviewed in previous surveys (panel
households). The sample size in the most recent surveys comprises about
8000 households, corresponding to around 24000 individuals. The ques-
tionnaire focuses on perceived wellbeing, the situation of the household
of origin, payment instruments and financial information.
In our empirical analysis, we will exploit data from 2002 to 2008, as we
will be interested in comparing retirement behaviour during reform years
and in pre-reform years. We said above that the reform took place in be-
tween October 2004 and the very end of 2007. However, because of the
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peculiar exit mechanism involved once one individual formally applies
for retirement, we need to redefine reform and pre-reform years. In par-
ticular, individuals who reached pension requirements and ask to retire in
a given quarter of the year have then to wait the first “exit window” to
actually retire. This window falls two quarters after the time of the retire-
ment request, thus the individuals we see retiring in 2005 are individuals
who took their decision to retire at the end of 2004, and individuals who
joined the reform up until the end of 2007 could retire only in 2008 7. For
this reason, pooled data from 2002 and 2004 surveys will give us infor-
mation on pre-reform behaviour, while data gathered from the 2006 and
2008 surveys will inform us on individuals’ behaviour during the reform
period.
Our sample of individuals will be made up of those who reached the age
and contributions requirements necessary for seniority pension, and our
outcome of interest will be the percentage of retired among these individ-
uals. As we will rely on a difference-in-differences evaluation method, we
will need to compare the behaviour of individuals not only through time
(before and during the reform) but also between individuals who were
affected by the reform (private workers) and individuals who were not
affected (public workers).
Figure 1 shows the hazard rate of retirement (the percentage retired at
a specific age conditional on not being retired at any prior age) averaged
over pre-reform years (1998 to 2004). It is possible to notice a clear ten-
dency towards retirement before old age (60 years for women and 65 years
for men). This is also apparent from the red bars in the graph, representing
sample medians. The average age of retirement is 58 years for women and
59 for men.
In Table 2 and 3 we show the results of two questions that appeared only
in 2002 survey. Specifically, the questions asked to those retired before
7It must also be taken into account that the survey defines as retired those whose main
condition in the year was retirement, thus presumably individuals who retired in the first
semester of the year.
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maximum retirement age (Table 2) and to those expecting to retire before
maximum pensionable age (Table3) if they would have worked longer, or
would work longer, under some conditions. These comprise economic
incentives, part-time or more flexible work and the possibility of cumu-
lating pension and earned income. We also split the results by sex and
work sector (public, private or self-employed). The percentage of retired
who claim they would have not worked longer is higher than the same
percentage among workers who expect to retire early. However, for both
categories economic incentives seem to be the most appealing condition
for postponing retirement, followed by the possibility of cumulating pen-
sion and earned income and by part-time or more flexible work. Males are
more prone to continue working under certain conditions than females.
Finally, while economic incentives and part-time are preferred by private
and public workers and retired relatively to self-employed, the possibility
of cumulating pension and earned income seems relatively more appeal-
ing for the self-employed.
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Figure 1: Hazard Rates, 1998-2004
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Table 2: Early Pensioners (retired before maximum retirement age): in
what conditions would he\she have worked longer?
All Males Females Public Private Self-employed
Economic Incentives 8.03 9.75 6.21 9.91 8.48 4.76
Part-time or more
flexible work 4.10 3.52 4.70 8.04 3.42 1.79
Possibility of
cumulating pension
and earned income
5.08 7.19 2.85 2.62 5.35 6.94
Other 4.00 4.96 5.04 5.98 4.70 4.76
None 78.34 75.14 81.70 74.77 78.47 81.75
Total 2442 1251 1191 535 1403 504
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for our sample of individuals, sep-
arately for public and private workers (respectively, the control and the
treatment groups) and pre- and post-reform periods (2002-2004 and 2006-
2008 respectively). The share of women is higher in the public sector than
in the private sector. The distribution of workers among educational lev-
els seems quite different, with a higher share of individuals with at least
high school diploma in the public sector than in the private one. Despite
the small sample size, there seems to be a larger presence of public work-
ers and pensioners in the Centre-South of Italy and of private workers
and pensioners in the North of Italy. Both the age and the years of con-
tributions are evenly distributed among sectors. The same seems true
about marital status. As regards working categories, most private work-
ers are blue collars (more than 60%), a smaller fraction is composed by of-
fice workers (around 25%) and the remaining consists of junior and senior
manager or similar positions. As for public workers, the biggest share is
composed of office workers (more than 40%), followed by school teachers,
blue collars and managers. Finally, at the bottom of the table retirement
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Table 3: If expect to retire before maximum pensionable age: in what con-
ditions would he\she have worked longer?
All Males Females Public Private Self-employed
Economic Incentives 14.89 17.67 10.45 16.73 16.67 10.64
Part-time or more
flexible work 6.30 6.71 5.65 6.08 8.06 4.26
Possibility of
cumulating pension
and earned income
10.33 11.31 8.76 9.51 8.06 14.18
Other 7.07 7.95 5.65 6.08 3.76 12.41
None 62.72 57.95 70.34 63.88 64.52 59.22
Total 920 566 354 263 372 282
percentages of public and private workers, before and after the reform,
are presented. These show that while the average percentage of retired
among public workers qualifying for seniority pension increases of some-
thing more than 5pps in the post-reform period, the same percentage de-
creases of around 5pps for private workers.
To better analyse the characteristics related to retirement, in Table 5 we
show the results of a linear probability model regression for the probabil-
ity of seniority retirement on the pre-reform sample of individuals. The
probability of seniority retirement is 7pps higher for private than for pub-
lic workers and, as expected, it is positively correlated with age. It is also
negatively correlated with having at least high school diploma, while it is
not correlated with sex, with being married or with having only children
who left parental home. However, the probability of seniority retirement
seems to be correlated with being male and not having children at home,
as we see from the significance of the coefficient of the interaction of these
two variables.
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4 The Estimation Strategy
Under certain assumptions, we will be able to compare the behaviour of
Italian workers regarding seniority pension before and after the reform, so
to study the efficacy of the reform in delaying the retirement decision of
private workers, as we would expect given the sizeable economic incen-
tive involved. As we can clearly identify individuals who were affected by
the reform (private workers) and individual who were not affected (public
workers), we can rely on a difference-in-differences (DID) technique.
The classical linear DID is based on an additive structure for potential
outcomes in the no-treatment state: in our case, this means assuming that
in the absence of the super bonus, retirement decisions are determined by
the sum of a time invariant effect specific to each category of workers (pub-
lic/private) and a time effect capturing the common trend. The common
trend assumption may be expressed as:
E[Y0i2 −Y0i1|X, T] = E[Y0i2 −Y0i1|X]
where Y0it is the outcome in the no-treatment case, i is the individual,
t is time (t = 2 in the post-treatment period, t = 1 in the pre-treatment
period), X is a set of covariates and T a treatment dummy. This assump-
tion is of course non testable, but we can at least gain some insight by
looking at seniority retirement percentages through time for public and
private workers. These are shown in Figure 2 and 3. In Figure 2 we report
seniority pension percentages for individuals at the contributions thresh-
old while Figure 3 presents retirement percentages for individuals at or
above contributions threshold. We present both because, as graphs them-
selves seem to suggest, we believe the effect to be stronger for individuals
who just reached pension requirements than for those who already de-
cided to continue working despite having reached pension requirements.
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Table 5
Linear Probability Model for retirement, pre-reform period
(1)
VARIABLES y2
priv 0.0742**
(0.035)
age 0.3334***
(0.102)
agesq -0.0028***
(0.001)
male -0.0380
(0.050)
married 0.0697
(0.043)
childout -0.0886
(0.058)
Centre South -0.0526
(0.032)
diploma -0.1178***
(0.036)
male*childout 0.1536**
(0.070)
Constant -9.6800***
(2.828)
Observations 641
R-squared 0.0809
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2: Percentage retiring among workers qualifying for seniority pen-
sion at the age/contributions threshold
Although these graphs cannot be interpreted as evidence that the common
trend assumption is true, they seem to support it.
Following Disney et al. (2010), we can write a general model of retire-
ment decision of individual i at time t, where Y∗it can be interpreted as a
latent variable measuring the utility from retiring once seniority pension
requirements have been reached. This utility depends on a set of individ-
ual characteristics like age, years of contributions, working sector, earn-
ings, career history and on a vector of time dummies to capture trends
over time:
Y∗it = β
′Xit + τ′dt + eit (1)
We do not observe Y∗it but a dichotomous variable taking up value one if
the individual decides to retire (when Y∗it ≥ 0) or value zero if the individ-
ual postponed retirement (when Y∗it ≤ 0), suggesting the use of a probit
or logit model. As we are interested in measuring if and how much the
percentage of those retiring changed in response to the super bonus dif-
ferently for those affected by the reform and those who were not, we need
18
Figure 3: Percentage retiring among workers qualifying for seniority pen-
sion
to define both a treatment and a post-reform variable. The former will be
a dummy variable Ti equal to one for treated individuals, that is private
workers, and equal to zero for public workers. The latter will be a dummy
variable Pt equal to one for post-treatment observations, that is those ob-
served in years 2006 and 2008, and equal to zero for year 2002 and 2004
observations.
If we knew Y∗it, we could estimate the effect of the reform by looking
at the coefficient α of the interaction between treatment and post-reform
dummies:
Y∗it = β
′Xit + τ′dt + ϕTi + αTiPt + eit (2)
However, as the outcome we observe is a dichotomous variable, we
know we are in the presence of a non-linear model. Despite this, our strat-
egy will be first of all to estimate a linear probability model of the type:
Yit = β′Xit + γ′Pt + ϕTi + αTiPt + eit (3)
In fact, the linear probability model has often proved to be a very good
19
approximation of probit and logit models and it usually works well for
values of the independent variables that are near the averages in the sam-
ple (see Wooldridge, 2008). The reason why it may be sometimes prob-
lematic is that we may get predictions outside the unit interval, as a linear
relationship is assumed to hold between the probability and the indepen-
dent variables.
Probit and logit models, however, are not free from drawbacks as well
when used in a DID framework. Here the issue is that the marginal ef-
fects calculated on interaction terms do not have the same interpretation
as in linear models (Blundell et al., 2004; Disney et al., 2008)8. However,
we can circumpass this problem by assuming that the common trend as-
sumption holds for a transformation of the expectations (retirement prob-
abilities), rather than for the expectations themselves. Specifically, it is safe
to assume that the common trend assumption holds for the inverse of the
probability function (that we will assume to be Normal, as in the probit
model) or, in other words, for the index rather than for the probability
(Blundell et al. 2004):
Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 1, It = 1)]−Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 1, It = 0)] =
Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 0, It = 1)]−Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 0, It = 0)]
(4)
Given this, the impact of the reform can be evaluated as:
I(X) =E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 1, It = 1)−Φ{Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 1, It = 0)]+
Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 0, It = 1)]−Φ−1[E(Yit|Xit; Lit = 0, It = 0)]}
(5)
Blundell et al. (2004) suggest to implement this estimator of the effect of
8Besides, it is worth remembering that commonly used software packages like Stata
do not give a true measure of interaction effects (Ai and Norton, 2003).
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a policy by estimating four different probit regressions for each of the four
groups defined by the interactions of time and treatment. Doing so, we get
an estimate of the behavioural patterns of the four groups, included that
triggered by the reform. Then, by predicting the outcome of the treated
using the untreated behavioural equations, one can get an estimate of
how the treated would have behaved without the treatment, conditional
on their observable characteristics. Finally, plugging these estimates in
Equation (5) one can get the estimate of the impact of the treatment on the
treated. This procedure is less restrictive than the usual DID in that it al-
lows for the effect of the treatment to depend on observable characteristics
of individuals 9.
5 Empirical Results
Table 6 reports the results of our DID linear probability model specifica-
tion. In column (1) we exploit the entire sample and show the most basic
result. This is obtained by regressing the dichotomous variable for retire-
ment (y2) on a set of dummy variables. The results indicate that, if as-
sumptions are true, the super bonus reform determined a 10pps reduction
in the proportion of private workers who decided to retire among those
qualifying for retirement. In column (3), we show a specification which
includes controls for age, age squared, schooling, area and marital status.
We obtain a significant reduction in retirement probability of 9pps, in line
with previous result.
In column (2) we show results of the same regression performed on the
subsample consisting of individuals just at the age and/or contributions
necessary for seniority pension. In fact, we expect the effect of the bonus to
be stronger on these individuals who are relatively younger (or with less
9Blundell et al. (2004), however, underlines that “Despite the similarity to the linear
case, the non-linear assumption stated above entails two additional restrictions on the
nature of the error terms: only group-effects are allowed for and between groups ho-
moscedasticity is required”.
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working years on the shoulders). Actually, what we are able to estimate is
a lower bound of the effect on these individuals. This is due to the fact that,
as workers joining the reform stop paying contributions, we are not able to
separate individuals who just reached the contributions-only requirement
of 38/39 contribution years from those who had already reached it. As our
lower bound estimate (-11pps) is higher than the full-sample estimate, we
can conclude that, as expected, the effect is actually stronger on relatively
younger (by age or working years) workers.
Table 7 reports DID Probit results. They seem to be in line with LPM
results and, if anything, they indicate an even bigger estimated impact of
the super bonus (-12pps), even when including the controls (-11pps).
In column (4) of Table 6 we include a full set of interaction dummies for
time, sector and economic condition. Specifically, we divide the sample
in two groups of similar size: low-income workers (blue collar workers
or blue collars retired as this is the category with the lowest average in-
come), and high-income workers (the four remaining working categories
as defined by the SHIW survey, broadly: office workers, school teachers,
junior managers and managers). Probably due to the small sample we are
dealing with, we are not able to get significant results for the interactions
of interest (post*priv and post*priv*high), which nevertheless are sizeable
in their magnitude and coherent with our previous results. In particular,
we obtain that most of the effect of the reform is driven by low-income
workers (-11pps), while it is much less effective for high-income workers
(-4pps).
6 Elasticity of Participation
In previous section we showed that the reform had a sizeable and signif-
icant effect on retirement decisions. However, this result does not allow
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Table 6
DID Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES y2 y1 y2 y2
post 0.0535 0.0440 0.0263 0.0169
(0.035) (0.048) (0.034) (0.102)
priv 0.1194*** 0.0777* 0.0945*** 0.0205
(0.032) (0.040) (0.033) (0.072)
post*priv -0.1030** -0.1131* -0.0898** -0.1114
(0.046) (0.059) (0.045) (0.109)
age 0.3317***
(0.074)
agesq -0.0027***
(0.001)
diploma -0.0931***
(0.026)
Centre South -0.0398*
(0.024)
married 0.0405
(0.031)
high -0.1394**
(0.071)
post*high 0.0499
(0.109)
priv*high 0.1000
(0.084)
post*priv*high 0.0729
(0.126)
Constant 0.1422*** 0.1560*** -9.7543*** 0.2558***
(0.023) (0.031) (2.071) (0.067)
Observations 1,239 765 1,239 1,239
R-squared 0.0106 0.0070 0.0624 0.0185
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Diff-in-Diff Probit
(1) Full sample
Predicted level after treatment Estimated impact of the reform
21% -12ppt **
(0.0583)
(2) Threshold Individuals
Predicted level after treatment Estimated impact of the reform
16% -12ppt *
(0.0749)
(3) Controls
Predicted level after treatment Estimated impact of the reform
22% -11ppt *
(0.0674)
(4) Low-income Individuals
Predicted level after treatment Estimated impact of the reform
18% -11ppt
(0.1153)
(5) High-income Individuals
Predicted level after treatment Estimated impact of the reform
27% -7ppt
(0.0804)
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to draw general conclusions on individuals’ response to monetary incen-
tives. If we want to infer predictions on workers’ behaviour, we need to
put this result in relation to the change in economic incentives implied by
the reform.
Thus, in the spirit of Manoli and Weber (2014), we will try to provide an
estimate of the extensive margin intertemporal labour supply elasticity. As
Manoli and Weber, we shall also stress that this is a reduced-form elasticity
that do not correspond to any of the structural parameters that can be
derived in a theoretical framework. Besides, differently from Manoli and
Weber, we exploit the shock created by a temporary reform, which makes
the comparison with elasticities found studying expected and permanent
reforms not trivial.
The main advantage of estimating the extensive margin elasticity in our
setting is given by the quasi-experimental framework which allows identi-
fication of the causal effect of the bonus. However, the SHIW dataset does
not allow a full reconstruction of workers’ career histories, making the
formulation of assumptions to derive individuals’ social security wealth
inevitably necessary.
In an option value framework, workers in each period evaluate the choice
between continue working and retire by comparing current and future
benefits from these two choices. For this reason, the incentive measure
should be a forward-looking measure that takes into account the trade off
between labour income and changes in social security wealth, net of taxes
and benefits.
As in Manoli and Weber (2014), we construct the incentive of retiring
measure as the implicit tax rate τ on gross annual earnings, defined such
that after-tax income is equated to gross earnings net of all taxes and re-
tirement benefits:
(1− τ)y = y(1− τSS)(1− τE)− b(1− τb) + ∆SSW (6)
where τSS denotes social security contribution, τE denotes income taxes,
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b denotes annual pension benefits, τb denotes taxes on pension benefits
and ∆SSW denotes the change in social security wealth. (1 − τ) is the
net-of-tax rate.
Given the characteristics of the super-bonus reform, the implicit tax rate
on gross earnings with the bonus is given by τ such that:
(1− τ)y = y(1− τSS)(1− τE) + yτSS − b(1− τb) (7)
Thus, the change in the net-of-tax rate may be written as:
− ∆(1− τ)
(1− τ) =
yτSS − ∆SSW
(1− τ) (8)
as it involved the suspension of due contributions, as well as a freeze of
social security wealth at the pre-reform level.
In order to obtain τ, we need to perform a series of operations. First of
all, we need to gross up wages by using information on tax rates, deduc-
tions due to family composition and social security contributions. Then, in
order to calculate social security wealth, we need to make a few assump-
tions on individuals’ working history, in particular on the number of years
individuals contributed to the social security system and on the earnings
average of the last working years. Due to the cross-section nature of our
data, we need to assume that individuals who are observed working did
not experience unemployment spells and thus contributed continuously
to social security. Finally, we estimate the growth rate of earnings as in
Bottazzi et al. (2006) 10. Social security wealth is then calculated by using
the rules in force at the time of the reform.
The average over individuals implicit tax rate τ that we estimate amounts
to almost 0.80, meaning that on average there is a huge incentive to post-
pone retirement of one year 11.
10Specifically, growth rates are obtained from a median regression of log-earnings of 50
to 65 years old individuals (SHIW, years 2002-2008) on sex, employment dummies and
full interaction of age with a college dummy.
11However, it is possible that the incentive to postpone retirement of more years is
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In Figure 4 we depict the relationship between the bonus (defined as
∆(1− τ)y) and earnings. The graph clearly shows that the bonus grows
with earnings. Interestingly, it also shows that the bonus is actually nega-
tive for low-income workers. This result is surprising in light of the find-
ings of previous section, where we have shown that the effect of the reform
is driven by low-income workers.
We believe there are a number of potential explanations for this. First
of all, it has been shown that some workers lack information to fully un-
derstand pension rules (Bottazzi et al., 2006), and this may well be related
to education and income. Second, it is possible that low-income work-
ers are credit constrained and see in the (negative) bonus an opportu-
nity for borrowing against future pension. Third, it is possible that low-
and high-income workers discount future differently and that low-income
ones have a shorter life expectancy.
Finally, we can get a reduced-form participation elasticity to quantify
how retirement decisions respond to a temporary financial incentive. This
elasticity is obtained by comparing the situation with the bonus with the
counterfactual situation of no bonus through the following formula:
e = − ∆p/p
∆(1− τ)/(1− τ) (9)
where p denote the probability of participation and ∆p is the change in
participation due to the reform that we estimated in previous paragraphs
by exploiting the quasi-experiment characteristics of the reform. Given
that the average retirement rate in the reform years was 21% and that we
estimate the bonus to have caused a 12pps increase in participation (im-
plying a counterfactual retirement rate equal to 33%), and given that we
estimate the change in net-of-tax rate to be around 0.76, we finally get a
higher than the incentive of postponing retirement of just one year. As suggested in the
option value theory of retirement, the incentive of retiring today should be compared
with the incentive of retiring at any future date. This analysis, however, is beyond the
scope of this work.
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Figure 4: Size of the bonus with respect to earnings
participation elasticity e = 0.48. However, we have seen above that the
effect of the reform was driven by low-income eligible workers. If we re-
strict our elasticity analysis to these individuals, we obtain a much higher
elasticity e = 1.2. The reason for this is that low-income workers face both
a lower bonus and lower implicit taxes on earnings.
7 Conclusion
Policymakers are often interested in policies that are able to delay retire-
ment and/or increase labour income at older ages. Only very recently,
however, taxes have been started to be thought as a possible instrument to
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do that. This interest, however, is relegated to the economic literature, as
in practice younger and older individuals are treated in a similar manner.
Social security contributions are an example of tax that could be used for
this purpose; however, there is limited evidence of the effect of incentives
on retirement behaviour.
In this paper, we want to contribute to this limited evidence by eval-
uating the effectiveness of the Italian so called super bonus reform, that
provided economic incentives to older workers eligible for seniority pen-
sions who decided to postpone retirement. As the reform was directed to
private workers only, we are able to use public workers as counterfactual
group. Thus, we can exploit the difference-in-differences approach and
compare retirement rates of private and public workers before and after
the reform to assess the effect of the reform.
A problem with interaction terms in probit models, however, is that
they do not have the same straightforward interpretation as in linear mod-
els. Thus, we employ the estimation strategy proposed by Blundell et al.
(2004), where the common trend assumption holds for the index rather
than the probability.
Our results show that old workers responded to the incentives offered
by the reform, as retirement rates among those eligible decreased by 9ppt-
12ppt depending on the specification and method used. Results also sug-
gest that the reform was particularly effective among the low-income work-
ers, despite the incentives were disproportionately growing with earnings,
maybe due to the predominance of substitution effect for these workers. If
assumptions are correct, this means around 35% of those who would have
retired chose not to because of the reform.
We also estimate the true size of the bonus, by taking into consideration
the trade-off between current gain and changes in social security wealth,
and estimate a participation elasticity of 0.48 for the overall eligible pop-
ulation, and 1.2 for low-income workers, who are the individuals who
mainly responded to the incentive of the bonus.
29
This is a sizeable effect, but of course we cannot say anything on the
efficiency of the reform from this partial analyses. In fact, it is possible
that the cost to the social security system in terms of lost contributions
from the workers who would have continued working even in the absence
of reform exceeds the gain from those who delay retirement because of the
reform. The fiscal cost of the super bonus, however, may have been offset
also by other factors, like taxes paid on labour income and taxes generated
by additional spending of those who postponed retirement.
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Abstract
This study estimates a structural reduced form of the “option value” model developed by
Stock and Wise (1990) using Italian data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE). These data offer great advantages over previous research (mainly based on
administrative data), due to the heterogeneity of the sample, the number of individual and job
characteristics and a retrospective panel which allows to derive the complete earning profiles
of workers. Exploiting exogenous changes in social security wealth (SSW) results show a sig-
nificant effect in the expected direction of SSW and of marginal incentives to retire. Results are
robust even after controlling for individual heterogeneity and its correlation with financial in-
centives. Using detailed information on individuals, the results also highlights the importance
of individual and job characteristics, which have been very little explored by this literature,
as determinants of retirement. This suggests the potential of “tagging” in the design of social
security incentives in order to reduce choice distortions and improve the overall efficiency of
the system.
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1 Introduction
The financial sustainability of pension systems around the world is jeop-
ardised by increased longevity, lower fertility and low growth. This issue
has generally been tackled with policies aimed at increasing average re-
tirement age. These usually work through financial incentives and a large
literature has supported the idea that financial incentives embedded in
pension systems do in fact influence retirement choices. 1
The analysis of retirement behavior based on micro-data in each of
twelve countries coordinated by Gruber and Wise (2004) shows a size-
able effect of social security incentives on retirement. This result is pretty
uniform across countries. Another recurrent empirical fact, which is not
completely explained by financial incentives even in very sophisticated
models, is the large peak in retirement registered at early and normal en-
titlement age. Among the possible explanations for this, social norms and
liquidity constraints due to small private savings have been mentioned.
However, other explanations of retirement have been overlooked. It
makes sense to think that other characteristics of workers may matter for
retirement, and that the same incentives may have different effects on dif-
ferent individuals. These characteristics may be observable, like health,
job quality and family features, or unobservable, like heterogeneous taste
for work or productivity. 2
This is important for policy and efficiency reasons. If unobserved char-
acteristics are important, it is more difficult to define an optimal (from a
social welfare point of view) age of retirement, and individuals - under
the assumption they know their own characteristics, like taste for work or
productivity, better than the social planner - should be left freer to choose
when to retire. This could reduce choice distortions and improve effi-
1Specifically, age of retirement. But what about other choices?
2Also wrong expectations, differently distributed among workers depending on char-
acteristics like for example education (Bottazzi, Jappelli, Padula 2006), may influence re-
tirement patterns.
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ciency, avoiding for example the losses in productivity that could arise
either by keeping unproductive workers at work or by inducing workers
who are still productive to retire.
At the same time, if individual characteristics unobserved by the pol-
icy maker are important, he may want to narrow the window of retirement
possibilities, otherwise a system that would be actuarially fair in the case
of no unobservables could result in being costly for the state.
Another argument that makes the analysis of older workers’ response
to incentives important is what is known as “tagging”. In general, the
impossibility for tax authorities to observe individuals’ potential earning
capacity and needs complicates tax design, in that taxes distort individu-
als’ labour supply choices. This in turn determines social welfare losses
from taxation. However, “the more the government can make the tax sys-
tem contingent on observable factors closely related to abilities and need,
the smaller the welfare losses from taxation” (“Tax by Design”, The Mir-
rlees Review, 2011). So, by analysing which groups of individuals are more
responsive to incentives, we are able to understand which characteristics
could be used to adjust incentives and make the social security system
more efficient. In general, age itself is an observable and immutable char-
acteristic that could be linked to taxation if, as existing literature seems
to suggest, people become more responsive to financial incentives around
retirement age.
This paper estimates a structural reduced form of the Option Value
model of retirement behaviour first developed by Stock and Wise (1990)
by using the Italian data of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE), which offer great advantages over previous research.
First, they allow to increase the heterogeneity of the sample by consid-
ering private, public and self-employed workers, while previous works
have mainly used administrative data on private workers. Besides, they
allow to control for a number of individual characteristics which are not
available in an administrative dataset. Finally, the dataset includes a ret-
3
rospective survey which allows to derive the complete earning profile of
workers, which is fundamental for a correct evaluation of social security
wealth.
After controlling for a number of significant individual and job char-
acteristics, as well as for the potential correlation of incentives and un-
observed individual effects, results suggest that workers are responsive
to the financial incentives embedded in the Italian social security system.
Results also suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is small and not sig-
nificant, and it totally disappears when many individuals and job charac-
teristics are controlled for, meaning that there is sufficient information to
explain heterogeneity among individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief descrip-
tion of existing literature on the option value model. Section 3 briefly in-
troduces the evolution of the Italian social security system institutional
features. Section 4 describes the option value model and its reduced form
estimation. In section 5 the data and the strategies followed in the em-
pirical analysis are presented. In section 6 the social security wealth and
marginal incentives measures are defined and presented. Section 7 shows
how control variables are constructed and describes them. In section 8,
results are presented and discussed. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The option value model was developed by Stock and Wise in 1990. In its
original form, this was a structural model of retirement with the aim of
capturing the forward-looking behaviour of individuals who compare the
value of retiring today with the value of retiring at any future date. Since
then, however, most of the applications of the option value model have not
provided structural estimates of the parameters of the model, but rather
have developed reduced form estimations of the model.
This empirical literature has probably received the most attention with
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a number of papers, collected by Gruber and Wise (2004), that estimate re-
duced forms of the option value model to data of 12 countries using a
common econometric methodology to allow comparability among them.
In general, the results show a strong causal effect of social security pro-
gram retirement incentives on labour force participation and a large mag-
nitude of these effects. However, evidence on Italy (Brugiavini and Perac-
chi, 2004) seems much weaker. The authors use a random sample of ad-
ministrative records from INPS (Italian Social Security Institute) on private
sector employees to estimate a probit model with financial incentives and
other explanatory variables. Seniority, a crucial element of financial in-
centives of retirement, is not known and imputed from the Bank of Italy’s
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Their results are mixed,
and sometimes present unexpected signs or non-significance of the finan-
cial incentives measures.
Previous results were not satisfactory either (see e.g. Ranzani 2006,
Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2003). They relied on the SHIW dataset, which
does not allow to reconstruct the entire working history of individuals,
which matters for seniority and earnings history, key elements of retire-
ment incentives calculation. Besides, none of the above mentioned works
exploited the panel data structure of data nor tried to account for hetero-
geneity of individuals and endogeneity of the financial incentives mea-
sures.
The only exception is Alessie and Belloni (2009), who use a correlated
random effect approach to address this issues. This is also the first work
able to find significant results in the expected direction. The authors claim
that the reason previous works were not able to find equally convincing re-
sults lies in the quality of data available and in the number of assumptions
needed to construct financial measures. However, the use of administra-
tive data on private workers (the Working History Italian Panel (WHIP),
and an additional pension file that provides information on seniority) no-
ticeably reduces the possibility to control for individual characteristics and
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casts doubts on the causal interpretation of results.
3 Italian Institutional Framework
Italy underwent many reforms and smaller changes of the social security
system in the last couple of decades. Before the reforms, the social secu-
rity system was a pay-as-you-go system based on a defined benefit mech-
anism. The main reason for this bloom of reforms was the clear financial
non-sustainability of the social security system before the nineties, mainly
due to the generosity of pensions, the possibility of early retirement and
low pensionable ages. Besides, it was considered unfair from a redistribu-
tive point of view because of the different treatment of different categories
of workers and because the form of actuarial adjustment with respect to
the choice of the age of retirement
Three major reforms were implemented in 1992, 1995 and 1997. The
main provisions of the 1992 reform consisted in the increase of pension-
able age, to be implemented gradually, from 60 to 65 years for men and
from 55 to 60 years for women for private workers (public workers and
self-employed pensionable age were already 65 and 60 for males and fe-
males respectively). The minimum number of years of contributions was
gradually increased as well from 15 to 20 years. The number of work-
ing years used to calculate the pensionable wage in the defined benefit
formula increased up to the last ten or to all working years, depending
on seniority: the more wage profiles were upward sloping, the more this
change penalised workers. Finally, indexation of pension benefits changed
from wage-based to price-based.
The 1995 reform was more radical as it changed the social security sys-
tem from defined benefit to “notional defined contribution”, with the aim
of increasing the link between contributions actually paid and benefits re-
ceived3. However, workers were divided into three categories depending
3Notional defined contribution systems mimic the characteristics of funded defined
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on seniority, and the new mechanism only applied fully to the youngest
workers (those who started working after 1995) and partially to middle-
aged workers (those with less than 18 years of contributions by the end of
1995). The reform also marked the beginning of complementary pension
systems.
The 1997 reform further tightened requirements for seniority pension
and also reduced the heterogeneity of treatments between different cate-
gories of workers. Age requirements were again tightened by 2004 and
2007 laws; the latter also changed the coefficients used in the contribution-
based formula. A 2010 law linked the age of retirement of workers to the
gain in life expectancy at age 65, starting from 2015.
The final step of this long period of reforms is represented by the 2011
“Fornero” reform, which is not analysed in the paper as the panel dataset
covers years up to 2011. 4. This reform was induced by the financial cri-
sis and new concerns about the sustainability of the social security sys-
tem. It accelerated the transition to the notional defined contribution sys-
tem by applying the contribution-based formula to all workers, indepen-
dently from seniority, for the contributions accrued after 2011. Besides, it
increased old-age pension to reach equality of treatment between males
and females, as well as minimum contributions requirements for old-age
pension and minimum contributions and age requirements for early retire-
ment. Finally, the reform provides for disincentives for those who claim
early retirement before 62 and some flexibility for those retiring between
the age of 62 and 70.
contribution systems but are actually not funded.
4However, when new panel data become available, it would be interesting to extend
the analysis and look also at the effect of this reform.
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4 Theoretical Framework
The approach followed in the paper requires an introduction to the “Option-
Value” model developed by Stock and Wise (1990). This model has typi-
cally been contrasted to dynamic programming models, and in particular
to life-cycle models, which are able to better represent the complexity of
reality, but with the drawback of computational complexity.
Nevertheless, it has been shown (see Belloni (2008) for a review) that
the option value model provides predictive validity in line with that of
dynamic programming models, thus it is also claimed that a real trade-
off between the two does not exist, as the option value model combines
computational tractability with predictive validity.
Actually, this paper will adopt a strategy involving a reduced-form
version of the original option value model developed by Stock and Wise
(1990). While in the structural model a maximum likelihood method is
used to estimate the parameters of a value function that yield the best fit to
data, in the reduced-form the expected gain from postponing retirement is
used as a regressor in a retirement probability model. This has the advan-
tage of being easy to implement, which explains the recent popularity of
this approach. On the contrary, attempts to estimate the structural model
are few and have sometimes been unable to identify all the parameters, or
have found implausible estimates and bad fit (Alessie and Belloni, 2013) 5.
In the following, the original option value model will be introduced.
Then, the reduced-form version will be presented and it will be shown
how, under certain assumptions, this is equivalent to the original Stock
and Wise’s option value.
5For example, Samwick (1998) writes: “In my attempts to estimate the parameters
of the option value model on the SCF sample, the parameters for the value of leisure in
retirement (k) and the discount rate (δ) could not be simultaneously identified with any
precision”. Alessie and Belloni (2013) represents a recent exception.
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4.1 The option value model
Stock and Wise (1990) developed an ”option value” model of retirement
that has the advantage of taking into account both current and future re-
tirement wealth accruals, differently from the one-year accrual that only
measures the change in social security benefits from working one addi-
tional year. The model starts with an indirect utility function:
Vt(R) =
R−1
∑
s=t
βs−tpi(s|t)Et(yγs ) +
T
∑
s=R
βs−tpi(s|t)Et[kBs(R)γ] (1)
In this expression, β is the discount factor, γ is the parameter of rela-
tive risk aversion, pi(s|t) is the survival probability to year s of someone of
age a in year t, and the expectation Et(·) denotes the expected value of fu-
ture income {ys} and retirement benefit streams {Bs(R)}. The factor k ex-
presses the idea that one income unit received while retired is worth more
than one income unit received while working; this may be interpreted as
value of leisure or distaste for working and is expected to be larger than
one. An individual chooses the optimal date of retirement R∗ that max-
imises the right-hand side of (1). Then the option value is defined as the
gain in indirect utility deriving from retiring at the optimal date rather
than at the current date t:
OVt(R∗) =Vt(R∗)−Vt(t)
=
R∗−1
∑
s=t
βs−tpi(s|t)Et(yγs ) +
T
∑
s=R∗
βs−tpi(s|t)Et[kBs(R∗)γ]
−
T
∑
s=t
βs−tpi(s|t)Et[kBs(t)]γ]
(2)
The first term represents the present discounted value of income re-
ceived from current date t and the date of retirement R∗. The second term
represents the utility of retirement benefits received between the date of
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retirement and the date of death T. The option value is then obtained by
subtracting the present discounted value of the benefits you would receive
from current date to death if you retired at current date. This way, one can
measure the excess of indirect utility of retiring at R∗ instead of t. As long
as the option value is positive, the worker will continue to work.
The authors’ estimation strategy was a maximum likelihood estima-
tion of the parameters of the above measure, allowing for serial depen-
dence and age-related heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
4.2 Reduced form version of the option value model
As an alternative, the option value of retirement can be assessed imposing
parameter values and using it as an explanatory variable in a reduced form
version model of retirement, together with SSW in level.
SSW is supposed to capture an income effect: the expectation is that,
all else equal, workers with greater SSW are more likely to retire 6. The in-
centive measure variables (the option value, but we will see that also oth-
ers may be exploited) capture instead the substitution effect on retirement
decision from foregone future labour income. Thus, a negative coefficient
attached to the incentive measure means that the greater the foregone op-
portunities, the less likely workers are to retire.
The Option Value is not the only marginal incentives measure that has
been exploited in the literature. Actually, other measures are most com-
monly used which, under certain assumptions, may be shown to be equiv-
alent to the OV. In the following, these measure will be briefly introduced:
• Peak value: Coile and Gruber (2000), following Stock and Wise’s
insight that a one-year forward measure may be misleading, devel-
oped a measure called “peak-value” which has the characteristic of
6Gruber and Wise (2004) underline that:“In principle, total wealth should be con-
trolled for, but in most countries the data do not provide measures of other forms of
wealth”.
10
being more forward looking than the accrual. “This is the value of
continuing to work until the future year when SSW is maximized, or
the difference between the expected PDV of SSW at its highest pos-
sible value in the future, and the expected PDV of SSW if you retire
this year. So this is like the typical accrual concept, except that the
individual looks forward to the optimal year, rather than just to next
year” (Coile and Gruber, 2000). They also normalize it by the present
discounted value of wages to weight the value of reaching the year
of maximal SSW relative to earnings expected in that period.
Samwick (2001, in Coile and Gruber) shows that the peak-value mea-
sure is actually equivalent to the option value under three parameter
restrictions. The peak value is given by:
PKVt(R∗) =
T
∑
s=R∗
βs−tpi(s|t)Et[Bs(R∗)]
−
T
∑
s=t
βs−tpi(s|t)Et[Bs(t)]
(3)
The first restriction is that the first term present in the option value
(the present discounted value of future earnings) is dropped. How-
ever, this can be simply accounted for by adding the present value
of earnings as a regressor in the reduced-form model, together with
the peak value.
The second restriction is that there is no disutility of working rel-
ative to being retired (k = 1). As Samwick notices: “...peak value
compares income flows only during retirement, so this assumption
is without loss of generality”. Besides, “...a value of k can be esti-
mated in a simple regression as long as the first term from the option
value calculation (the present value of future earnings) is included
as a regressor along with peak value. The value of k would be the
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ratio of the coefficient on the peak value term to the coefficient on the
earnings term” (Samwick, 2001).
The third restriction is that workers are indifferent to whether in-
come and retirement benefit payments vary across years (γ = 1).
Samwick notices that since the peak value calculation pertains only
to income received in retirement, the choice of γ is less important 7.
What instead is different between the two concepts is the optimal
retirement age R∗ they deliver, due to the absence in the peak value
of the present value of future earnings.
• Accrual: is the euro change in SSW from previous year (Coile, Gru-
ber 2001). The appropriateness of this measure was called into ques-
tion in the seminal work by Stock and Wise (1990) who noticed that
a one-year forward measure may no be an adequate measure of pri-
vate pensions as they often present high incentives to retire at spe-
cific ages, which implies high incentives or disincentives for retire-
ment in future years. However, it may still be useful as workers may
be not completely forward-looking or may not be willing to post-
pone retirement of too many years. For this reason, it is common in
the literature to present the accrual together with the option value
or other incentive measures that are closer to the concept of option
value.
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Dataset
We will exploit the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE). This is a cross-national panel database of micro data on health,
7Even if it is advisable to experiment with different values of γ = 1 to study the
sensitivity of the estimates to income smoothness.
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socio-economic status and social and family networks of more than 85,000
individuals from 19 European countries aged 50 or over. It consists of 3
waves (2004, 2006/07, 2010) plus SHARELIFE (2008/09) that reconstructs
individuals life history and events.
This dataset presents many advantages for the study of retirement de-
cisions with respect to other datasets used in previous literature, and con-
tains information which is particularly useful given the characteristics of
the Italian social security legislation.
First of all, it is a rich dataset in terms of individual, household and job
characteristics. As will be made clearer later, a rich set of controls mitigate
the endogeneity problem related to financial variables. Thus, it will be
also possible to figure out if the effect of financial variables is still present
once variables that may be correlated both with the choice of retirement
and with financial incentives are controlled for. Besides in this work, dif-
ferently from previous literature, we are explicitly interested in evaluating
how the effect of financial variables on retirement compares with other
determinants of retirement.
At least as importantly, the survey contains information on all type of
workers (private, public and self-employed). As will be made clearer later,
this is important from an empirical point of view because these workers
are subject to different social security rules, and their presence allows to
considerably increase the variability of the financial incentives measures.
Finally, a fundamental advantage is that the third wave (2008/2009)
of SHARE, called SHARELIFE, focusses on individual’s life histories, thus
having the characteristics of a retrospective panel. Specifically, it contains
retrospective information on children, partner, housing, childhood condi-
tions, work history, work quality, financial history, health history and on
general life. The work history section contains information on the start
and end date of each spell of work, together with information on the first
salary or income of each spell, first and final salary or income of the main
work spell and, importantly, if contributions to the social security system
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were paid in that spell.
This is in contrast with previous literature that studied retirement in
Italy. The first papers appeared used data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey
on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 8. This dataset has a number
of drawbacks in that it is not possible to reconstruct individuals’ wage
history without making strong assumptions on their career paths and on
wage growth. Besides, seniority is asked to individuals only starting since
1995 and there is no information about the contributions paid in each spell
of work. Finally, despite the availability of many individuals characteris-
tics, they have not been exploited in a model together with the financial
incentives measures.
The most recent works appeared (Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004; Alessie
and Belloni, 2009) instead use either the “O1M” or the “Working History
Italian Panel” (WHIP) datasets, which are random sample of administra-
tive data extracted from the National Institute of Social Security (INPS)
archives. The advantage of these datasets are mainly the bigger sample
size and, being administrative and not self-reported data, the precision
with which wages are measured. Besides, Alessie and Belloni (2009) also
complement the dataset with another INPS file containing information on
seniority, which was not observed with precision in previous works, and
show how the quality of this variable is important to get precise social
security wealth (SSW) and marginal incentives (MI) measures.
However, these data are still problematic in many respects. First, they
contain only basic information on workers’ and jobs characteristics (gen-
der, age, region of birth and industry). Second, the dataset covers only
private workers, not public nor self-employed. As these workers are sub-
ject to different social security rules, the variability of incentives measures
is greatly reduced. Besides, even if seniority is observed, the other funda-
mental element for the calculation of benefits, that is wage profile, must
be estimated. Finally, seniority is available only if workers already retired
8Spataro 2005; Colombino 2003; Miniaci 1998
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and is not available if they had interrupted careers or if they contributed
for some periods to other schemes, like the one administered by the public
sector. In conclusion, this selection makes the dataset not representative of
the Italian working population.
The drawback is that it is a relatively small sample, so we cannot solve
the problem of sample selection, for example, by looking at those younger
than 50 in the first year and follow them towards their old age. However,
it must be underlined that a number of authors simply make explicit that
the analysis is conditional on being in the sample (see for example Stock
and Wise, 1990 and Coile and Gruber, 2001).
5.2 Identification Issues
As put well by Gruber and Wise (2004), a crucial issue in the analysis of
retirement “is identification - that is, determination of the separate effect of
each variable on retirement, as distinct from each of the other variables”.
In fact, to determine the effect of social security or pension incentives on
retirement we need to be able to separate the pure effect of economic in-
centives from the other determinants of SSW, like for example age and
income. Controlling for these other characteristics is important if they
are also independently correlated with retirement choices, otherwise we
might be capturing their effect instead.
However, the authors also notice that there might be a trade-off to
take into account when controlling for these other variables, as their es-
timated effect may capture part of the effect pertaining to financial incen-
tives, rather than individual heterogeneity, thus leading to an underesti-
mation of the incentives themselves. For this reason, exogenous variation
of social security wealth is important for identification. Italy represents a
particularly well-suited setting in this respect, given the various reforms
and minor changes that affected social security in the last twenty and more
years that were presented above.
Identification, as first observed by Hurd (1990) and then reiterated by
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Coile and Gruber (2001), may also be reached “if there are significant non-
linearities and interactions otherwise (likely) uncorrelated with retirement
that primarily identify the impact of these incentive measures, one might
feel more confident about retirement estimates” (Coile and Gruber, 2001).
In this paper, the first year used in the panel will be 1993. Thus, all pre-
1993 reforms (most noticeably, 1992 reform) will not be directly taken into
account. However, these reforms differently affected private, public and
self-employed workers, in ways that are exogenous to individual hetero-
geneity. As long as individuals do not change job as a consequence of
these reforms, also this dimension of variation may be exploited 9.
Despite previous literature had been stressing the need for exogenous
variation of SSW, not much effort has been done to address the problem
of endogeneity that may arise from omitting other non-financial determi-
nants of retirement and from the presence of individual heterogeneity.
As regards the second aspect, some of the most recent and cited works
on reduced forms of the option value model were collected by Gruber and
Wise (2004). Each of them studies retirement in 12 different countries us-
ing a common econometric methodology to allow comparability among
results. However, despite the availability of panel data, all these works es-
timated pooled probit models which ignore the presence of individual het-
erogeneity and the endogeneity issues that this may rise. Taste for work
is the typical example of unobserved individual characteristic that may
determine retirement and be related with SSW.
Alessie and Belloni (2009) are the first to address this problem by using
a Correlated Random Effect model, but unfortunately the impossibility to
control for individual and job characteristics (due to the administrative
nature of their data) makes this approach not convincing either. In the fol-
lowing paragraph it will be shown how this paper deals with endogeneity.
9Both Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) and Alessie and Belloni (2009) show that these
job transitions in old age are very rare.
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5.3 The Retirement Model
The binary nature of the outcome variable complicates the treatment of
individual heterogeneity. Given these difficulties, different econometric
models and specifications will be estimated and compared. In particular,
we will follow Wooldridge (2010) in the way nonlinear panel data analy-
sis is conducted. In general, no method is strictly preferable to another: it
really depends on the assumptions one is willing to make and the struc-
ture one is willing to impose. However, the analysis will concentrate on
models which, even if will not always allow to identify parameters, will al-
ways allow to identify at least partial effects (PE) or average partial effects
(APE), which ultimately should be the quantities of interest.
Retirement is a binary choice and, as previous literature, we assume
it is an absorbing state. This is coherent with the data as transitions from
retirement back to work are virtually non-existent 10. In its most general
form, retirement probability can be expressed as:
p(xt, c) = P(yit|xit = xt, ci = c) (4)
where yit is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is retired, xit
is a set of observed explanatory variables and ci is heterogeneity.
The analysis will start with a linear model, specifically an unobserved
effects linear probability model estimated by fixed effect 11. A linear model
may deliver a poor approximation of partial effects, but this is the only
way unobserved heterogeneity may be eliminated. Conditional MLE (used
to eliminate heterogeneity) can in fact be applied only in special cases and
does not allow to identify PEs nor APEs, while models where the fixed
effects are treated as parameters to be estimated suffers from an incidental
parameters problem which leads to inconsistent estimation. Of course, a
FE model will drop also all time invariant explanatory variables.
10See Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) and Alessie and Belloni (2009).
11A robust variance matrix estimator is necessary to account for serial correlation
across t.
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Another solution is the Unobserved Effects Probit model. The assump-
tions of this model are:
1. The model is:
P(yit = 1|xit, ci) = Φ(xitβ+ ci), t = 1, ..., T (5)
where Φ is the standard normal c.d.f.
2. Strict exogeneity conditional on ci:
P(yit = 1|xi1, ..., xiT, ci) = P(yit = 1|xit, ci), t = 1, ..., T (6)
3.
ci|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2c ) (7)
If one is not willing to make other assumptions (in particular condi-
tional independence), one can consistently estimate APEs through a pooled
probit model. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3:
P(yit = 1|xi) = P(yit = 1|xit) = Φ(xitβc) (8)
where βc = β/(1 + σ
2
c )
1/2 is a scaled coefficient which is sufficient
to estimate the APE. This is clear from the APE formula for a continuous
variable xtj:
APE = [β j/(1+ σ2c )
1/2]φ[xtβ/(1+ σ2c )
1/2)] (9)
APEs are identified more often than PEs; in fact, the scaled coefficient
is not sufficient to estimate PEs, for which we need the coefficients:
PE = β jφ(xtβ) (10)
A robust variance matrix estimator is necessary to account for serial
correlation across t.
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If one is willing to add a fourth assumption:
4. yi1, ..., yiT are independent conditional on xi = (xi1, ...., xiT) and ci.
then the parameters β and σ2c can be identified through a conditional
maximum likelihood approach. The likelihood function for each i may be
recovered by integrating out ci:
Li(θ|yi, xi) = f (y1, ..., yT|xi; θ) =
=
∫ +∞
−∞
T
∏
t=1
Φ(xtβ+ c)yt [1−Φ(xtβ+ c)]1−yt( 1
σc
)φ(
c
σc
)dc
(11)
Then, the log-likelihood for the entire sample may be maximised with
respect to β and σ2c to get consistent estimators. It is then possible to com-
pare pooled MLE and MLE probit coefficients by multiplying MLE coeffi-
cients for the scale factor 1
(1+σ2c )1/2
.
The Unobserved Effects Probit model described above does not al-
low for any correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and covariates.
This would for example exclude the possibility for taste for work to be
correlated with income and (consequently) social security wealth. As this
may seem unrealistic, a Correlated Random Effects model has been pro-
posed to relax this assumption. In this model, assumption 3 is changed
to explicitly allow for correlation between ci and some elements of xit. As
in Alessie and Belloni (2009), financial incentives in the first year in which
each worker is observed may be used to model the heterogeneity ci. Of
course, other functions of xit may be used, like the average x¯i or its sample
variances or covariances (see Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1980; Altonji
and Matzkin, 2005). Thus, assumption 3 is changed to:
ci|xi ∼ Normal(ψ+ωi1ξ, σ2a ) (12)
where ωi1 is the first time observation of time-varying financial variables
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(in particular, SSW and MI), σ2a is the variance of ai in the equation ci =
ψ+ωi1ξ + ai and ai|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2a ).
The model above can be also seen as a latent variable model of the
individuals’ utility from retirement:
y∗ = ψ+ xitβ+ x¯iξ + ai + eit (13)
where eit are independent Normal(0, 1) and ai|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2a ),
which now looks like a traditional random effects probit model. This can
be implemented by simply adding the first time observation of financial
variables to the regressors in the equation.
The CRE model allows to include time dummies and time-constant
control variables, as long as we assume their coefficient in ξ is zero, other-
wise their effect can not be distinguished from that of unobserved hetero-
geneity. As mentioned above, Alessie and Belloni (2009) are the first to use
a CRE approach in a reduced form of the option value model. However,
even if one believes that the individual effect is only correlated to financial
variables in a retirement model, the lack of information on fundamental
characteristics such as health, marital status or other non-social security
wealth, likely makes their results subject to omitted variable biases.
As a final note, it should be mentioned that while in linear models one
can deal with serial dependence of idiosyncratic error with robust stan-
dard error, in nonlinear models estimated by MLE conditional indepen-
dence is necessary for consistency (Wooldridge, 2010).
6 Social Security Wealth
6.1 SSW Definition
In this part, notation is borrowed from Alessie and Belloni (2009), although
with some noticeable differences. The most important are that, due to
the different time span considered, different reforms will be considered.
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Besides, given that SHARE data allow to know not only seniority, but also
in which spells of work contributions were paid, some workers fall into
the pro-rata system, where benefits are computed in part with an earnings-
related system and in part with a contribution-related system. Finally, we
don’t need to make assumptions on marital status and on spouses as also
spouses are observed in the data.
As previous literature, SSW is defined as the expected present dis-
counted value of benefits, from which contributions that a worker would
pay to the social security system in case of continued work are subtracted
12.
Social security wealth may then be calculated as:
SSWa,R =

Ω
∑
s=R+1
ρ(s)BR(s) if R = a
Ω
∑
s=R+1
ρ(s)BR(s)−
R
∑
s=a+1
ρ′(s)c(s) if R > a
(14)
where:
ρ(s) = βs−api(s|a)[1+ λ0.6βqs+1
Ω
∑
τ=s+1
pi(τ − e|s+ 1− e)βτ−s−1] (15)
ρ′(s) = βs−api(s|a) (16)
ρ′(s) is the discount factor referred to future contribution payments
composed by the discount factor β = 0.97 (3% discount rate) and the sur-
vival probability (by gender) conditional to age a 13. ρ(s) is a discount
factor that takes into account survivor’s benefits: in case the of death of
the pension recipient, the survivor spouse is entitled to 60 per cent of the
12See for example Borsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999), Blanchet and Pele´ (1999) and
Diamond and Gruber (1999)
13Conditional survival probabilities are derived from ISTAT tables and refer to year
2004. It will be assumed for now that conditional survival probabilities are constant in
the years considered.
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deceased’s pension 14.
Benefits are due conditional on workers reaching eligibility, which con-
sists in certain age and/or years of contributions requirements:
BR(s) =
BR(s) if s ≥ agemr(R)0 otherwise (17)
where agemr(R) is the age when eligibility is reached.
As mentioned before, in the period under study (1993-2011) different
benefit calculation rules are applied depending on the years of contribu-
tions accrued at the end of 1995. This is because Italian legislation, through
a number of reforms started in the nineties, provided for a gradual change
from an earnings model to a contribution based model.
Specifically, before 1992, all workers fell into a pure earnings model.
A reform in 1992 (“Riforma Amato”) gradually increased the number of
years used to calculate pensionable earnings, defined as the average wage
of the last years of work, with the aim of reducing the generosity of pen-
sions. The pension was determined by a two-components formula, where
the two components apply different rules to pre- and post-1992 years of
contributions.
Specifically, “old” workers (those with at least 15 years of contribu-
tions before the end of 1992) fell under the earnings model.
The earnings-based formula used before year 1996 is then:
BR(s) = PE · α · sen92 + PE′ · α′ · [min(senR, 40)− sen92] (18)
where PE and PE′ are pensionable earnings; sen92 is seniority up to
the end of 1992; senR is seniority at retirement (40 contribution years is the
maximum allowed); α is the rate of return.
14Actually, the social security provision on survivors is more complicated than this
and involves an increasing percentage of the deceased’s benefits depending on the num-
ber of children, who however must be younger than 18 or financially independent from
parents. We are implicitly assuming that all children comply with these characteristics.
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Pensionable earnings for “old” workers (those with at least 15 years of
contributions before the end of 1992) are defined as:
PE =
∑k−1x=0 YR−x
k
(19)
PE′ = ∑
k′−1
x=0 YR−xδt
k′
(20)
where k = 5 and k′ = 10 (gradually) for private workers, k = 1 and
k′ = 10 (gradually) for public workers and k = k′ = 10 for the self-
employed. For “young” workers (those with less than 15 years of con-
tribution at the end of 1992) instead k′ gradually increases to the total of
years of contributions. δt is the revaluation coefficient of salaries 15.
The rate of return α is decreasing in pensionable earnings:
α =

0.02 PE ≤ θ1
0.015 θ1 < PE ≤ θ2
0.0125 θ2 < PE ≤ θ3
0.01 PE > θ3
(21)
α′ =

0.02 PE′ ≤ θ1
0.016 θ1 < PE′ ≤ θ2
0.0135 θ2 < PE′ ≤ θ3
0.011 θ3 < PE′ ≤ θ4
0.009 PE′ > θ4
(22)
where the thresholds θ are fixed each year by law.
In 1995, a new reform (“Riforma Dini”) changed again the rules and
introduced a notional defined contribution system for younger workers.
For “old-aged” workers (those with more than 18 years of contribution at
15Up to 1993 revaluation is based on ISTAT consumer price index, after 1992 is based
on ISTAT consumer price index plus one percentage point for each contribution year.
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the end of 1995), there was an acceleration towards the higher number of
year of contributions that enter in the PE formula (k′′):
PE′′ = ∑
k′′−1
x=0 YR−xδt
k′′
(23)
“Middle-aged” workers (those with less than 18 years of contributions
before the end of 1995) fall into the pro-rata model, where pension entitle-
ment is calculated following the earnings model for contribution years be-
fore 1996 and the notional defined contribution model for after-1995 years
16. The pro-rata model is thus composed by three parts, related to the
contributions paid before 1993 (earnings model), between 1993 and 1995
(earnings model based on a longer salary history) and after 1995 (defined
contribution model):
B′R(s) =PE · α · sen92 + PE′ · α′ · [sen95 − sen92]+
PE′′ · τ · γ · [min(senR, 40)− sen95]
(24)
where τ is the contribution rate 17, γ is the coefficient (which depends
on retirement age and life expectancy) transforming contributions into
benefit flows and:
PE′′ =
R−1
∑
t=0
Yt(1+ g)R−1−t (25)
where g is a 5-year moving average of GDP growth rate. Other mi-
nor changes in later sample years are not reported, but provide further
variation to the SSW measure.
16The contribution model alone applied to those who started working after 1995, so
it is not relevant for our sample. Since 2012, the contribution model will apply to every-
body, as provided for by the latest reform (“Riforma Fornero”).
17In the time span considered, the contribution rate grew from 27% to 33% for private
and public workers and from 14% to 20% for self-employed.
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6.2 SSW Calculation
One of the main advantages of SHARE is the possibility of reconstructing
individuals’ wage and income profiles from SHARELIFE, the third wave
of SHARE. In this wave, retrospective information on various aspects of
respondents’ lives are asked. As explained above, this is particularly use-
ful for SSW calculation, where seniority and past earnings are needed.
A typical issue with retrospective data is recall bias, a distortion arising
from the inability or unwillingness to remember past events accurately.
However, Havari and Mazzonna (2011), among others, show that recall
bias seems not to be a threat to the validity of information contained in
SHARELIFE 18
In the working history section of SHARELIFE, respondents are asked
to provide start and end dates of each job they held together with the first
monthly wage after taxes (for self-employed, monthly income is asked in-
stead). The current wage of employed respondents is also asked, as well
as the final wage of the main job spell for those who are already retired 19.
Brugiavini et al. (2013) reshaped the working life information of re-
spondents contained in SHARELIFE to build a (retrospective) panel 20,
which will be exploited here as starting dataset. As it contains only basic
information, all other variables of interest must be linked to this retrospec-
tive panel from SHARELIFE; besides, information contained in the fourth
wave of SHARE will be used to fill the panel from 2008/2009 (the inter-
view years) to 2011 21.
18The authors compare consistency of answers on some specific events contained in
SHARE (at the time of occurrence of the events) and SHARELIFE, and find less than 10%
recall errors overall.
19Main job spell is defined as “the last job in the career or the occupation that took up
most of your working life”.
20SHARELIFE is in fact released as an individual level dataset where life events are
organized in a flat file format. A few assumptions were needed in order to resolve some
data inconsistency, see Brugiavini et al. (2013).
21The vast majority of workers worked continuously between the third and fourth
waves, and for most of those who didn’t the reason was retirement. Some assumptions
were needed in the rare remaining cases, for example if industry and job title in 2011 are
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From these information, wage and income profiles are derived using a
strategy similar to Weiss (2012). First of all, in the total sample around 24%
of first wages and incomes are missing, thus their values are imputed us-
ing predictive mean matching. This is an imputation method that works
by estimating missing values through a regression. First, annual wages
and incomes are regressed on a set of variables (cohort, decade start of
the job spell, geographic area, education, type of job and working hours),
separately for males and females. Then, rather then using directly these
estimates, one or more neighbours who have similar estimated values are
identified. Finally, the corresponding observed values are randomly cho-
sen among the nearest neighbours and used as estimate for the missing
values. 22
By exploiting the information contained in SHARELIFE, a model for
the logarithm of final wages y f of the main job spell can be estimated using
potential labour market experience, other covariates and their interactions
as explanatory variables:
y f = β1E f + β2E2f + β3E fS+ β4E fX f + β5S+ β6X f + β7W +U (26)
In this equation, potential labour market experience is defined as E f =
(A f − S− 5), where 5 is the age of school entry, S stands for years of ed-
ucation and A f is age at the end of the spell. X f is a set of individual
characteristics specific of the job spell (white collar, self-employed, indus-
try, geographic area), while W is a set of time-invariant characteristics like
cohort and some characteristics of the individual when she was ten years
old that should account for ability. These are an indicator of the number
of books present at home when the individual was ten years old, whether
the same reported in the third wave, they are the same also in 2010.
22Five imputed values are estimated for each missing value, originating 5 different
datasets. As stated in SHARE Release Guide 2-5-0, all datasets should be used for esti-
mation of statistical models. However, as a first approximation, the average of the five
imputations is used instead.
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the individual was better compared to others in mathematics, whether she
was better in language, the features of the accommodation and an indica-
tor of house size 23.
Estimated coefficients and the logarithm of starting (observed or im-
puted) wage yt0j are then used to predict the logarithm of final wage yt1j
for each spell j:
yˆt1j =yt0j + βˆ1(Et1j − Et0j) + βˆ2(E2t1j − E2t0j)+
βˆ3(Et1jS− Et0jS) + βˆ4(Et1jXj − Et0jXj)
(27)
where Et1j and Et0j denote potential experience at the beginning and at
the end of each spell. Finally, the annual growth of earnings is computed
as (yˆt1j − yt0j)/lenj, where lenj is the length of the employment spell, and
used to generate annual wage profiles.
Generated wage and income profiles are shown in Figure 1 and Figure
2, for males and females respectively. Similarly to Weiss (2012), the accu-
racy of the procedure is checked by applying it to current (in 2011) and
final wage/income of the main job spells and testing statistical difference
from their observed values. Means and predicted errors are reported in
Table 1 and Table 2, for males and females respectively. Using final wages,
predicted values are not statistically different from their observed counter-
parts; using current wages, predicted values are not statistically different
from observed ones only for males.
23As in Weiss (2012) the indicator for books takes value one if less than ten books are
reported. The indicators for mathematics and language take value one if the individual
report being better or much better than others. The indicators for the features of the
accommodation are dummies for the presence of fixed bath, cold running water supply,
hot running water supply, inside toilet and central heating. The indicator for house size
takes value one if the number of rooms occupied divided by the number of people living
in the household is equal or higher than one.
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Figure 1: Imputed Wage Profiles, Males
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Figure 2: Imputed Wage Profiles, Females
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Table 1: Prediction error for current and main wage, males
Variable Sample size Mean Std. Dev.
Log current income 124 9.4720 1.0916
Predicted log current income 124 9.5832 1.8846
Prediction error 124 0.1112 2.1136
Log main income 707 9.4841 1.4557
Predicted log main income 707 9.5516 1.8511
Predicted error 707 0.0676 2.1353
Table 2: Prediction error for current and main wage, females
Variable Sample size Mean Std. Dev.
Log current income 116 9.0979 1.0785
Predicted log current income 116 9.1439 1.2236
Prediction error 116 0.0460 1.3479
Log main income 567 8.7048 1.6491
Predicted log main income 567 9.0066 1.7402
Predicted error 567 0.3018 1.8439
Expected wages and income are estimated in a similar fashion. In each
year from 1993 to 2011 and for each age, remaining years up until age
70 (which is assumed to be the maximum age for risk of retirement) are
treated as a final employment spell. Final wage and income are predicted
as for any other spell, assuming that the worker does not change occupa-
tion. Finally, as pension benefits are based on gross wages and income,
while values asked in SHARELIFE are net of all taxes and contributions,
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wages and incomes are grossed up using information on tax rates and re-
leases due to family composition 24.
Medians of SSW, accrual and peak value by age are shown in Table
3 and 4, for males and females respectively. It clearly emerges from the
tables that the marginal incentives are negative for most ages, but as ex-
pected less so for the peak value than for the accrual.
24Due to difficulties find information on taxation before year 1974, profiles are grossed
up only starting from this year. This does not represent a problem, however, due to the
fact that social security rules are not based on very past away wages or incomes.
31
Table 3: Financial Incentives, Males
Age SSW Accrual Peak Value
Median S.D. Median S.D. Median S.D.
50 24.6150 26.6655 0.0370 2.5122 0.4142 7.7071
51 25.0862 28.0688 -0.0105 5.9872 0.2397 9.1551
52 23.5864 28.2562 -0.0106 5.7575 0.2490 8.5980
53 24.4424 31.6363 -0.0422 2.0994 0.1304 6.2018
54 24.9829 31.8274 -0.2474 2.6111 -0.1602 6.3311
55 25.3952 33.9326 -0.1763 2.6386 -0.0682 6.2933
56 27.9680 36.1362 -0.3121 2.2033 -0.1891 6.5864
57 30.6207 37.2755 -0.2871 1.7483 -0.2089 5.3964
58 31.2187 37.8003 -0.2543 5.7787 -0.2088 7.7714
59 28.5849 36.3384 -0.2938 1.6821 -0.2175 4.7761
60 29.3388 37.2161 -0.3178 2.1644 -0.2401 4.5547
61 26.3433 38.5049 -0.2979 2.6056 -0.2832 4.2787
62 23.5594 39.5353 -0.3777 3.1128 -0.3487 4.0074
63 17.4790 36.3892 -0.3152 1.6327 -0.2827 4.0407
64 17.8395 37.3620 -0.4574 4.6839 -0.3404 5.4152
65 17.0729 39.7816 -0.3222 4.6412 -0.3092 4.7760
66 17.2503 34.0953 -0.2776 1.3565 -0.2733 1.4939
67 29.9629 39.3680 -0.5272 1.9864 -0.2911 2.0510
68 26.0505 41.6922 -0.6661 2.0698 -0.6661 2.0698
69 34.8642 43.7335 -0.8315 2.6558 -0.8315 2.6558
70 12.9968 41.6823 -1.0181 1.8980 -1.0181 1.8980
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW, ACC and PV are divided by
10000.
32
Table 4: Financial Incentives, Females
Age SSW Accrual Peak Value
Median S.D. Median S.D. Median S.D.
50 15.8468 36.8136 -0.0094 4.1472 0.2915 8.4661
51 16.9408 39.2218 -0.0559 1.7863 0.4600 7.0963
52 17.6495 41.3531 -0.1034 2.3012 0.5325 7.2680
53 18.3033 41.8625 -0.0708 2.0261 0.4675 6.2025
54 18.5433 38.4162 -0.1296 5.3876 0.5106 7.6553
55 18.4315 40.2780 -0.1167 2.0100 0.6279 5.2324
56 18.9457 40.5536 -0.1290 2.3954 0.3501 4.4124
57 21.6397 40.8610 -0.0973 2.0098 0.3330 3.0429
58 20.3712 43.9714 -0.1636 1.8392 0.0320 2.6097
59 19.4118 42.0245 -0.1555 1.7580 -0.0071 2.7137
60 15.9009 42.9227 -0.2268 1.6631 -0.1967 2.4849
61 14.5973 36.3561 -0.2148 2.1609 -0.1771 2.3749
62 18.4248 28.4328 -0.3544 3.3303 -0.3524 3.3801
63 13.1113 26.3397 -0.4056 1.0721 -0.3792 1.2233
64 11.0022 33.8016 -0.4994 1.1245 -0.4994 1.2380
65 15.9884 35.8265 -0.5245 1.2674 -0.5245 1.2903
66 14.4972 8.9726 -0.4012 0.4039 -0.4012 0.4039
67 14.1989 8.7220 -0.4825 0.2574 -0.4825 0.2574
68 9.4695 5.0880 -0.3214 0.2074 -0.3214 0.2074
69 9.0788 5.0068 -0.2803 0.2055 -0.2803 0.2055
70 13.0738 5.4837 -0.1991 0.3552 -0.1991 0.3552
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW, ACC and PV are divided by
10000.
7 Control Variables
As already stressed above, one of the advantages of SHARELIFE over ad-
ministrative data is the possibility to control for individual and job char-
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acteristics that may be important for the decision to retire and that are
likely correlated with social security wealth. Omitting them could bias es-
timated values of the social security financial variables. In the following
paragraphs, the choice of control variables will be briefly discussed.
In Table 5 and Table 6 descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
econometric analysis are presented, for males and females respectively.
The average age of the sample (that is, conditional on being older than
50 and in the labour force) is 57 for males and 56 for females. More fe-
males then men reside in the North of Italy. More males than females are
self-employed, while the opposite holds true for the public sector. The
proportion of white collar and managers are instead similar25. Almost all
individual-year observations in the sample are married, 33% of males and
44% of females have a working spouse.
The wealth, health and work quality variables are separately presented
in the next paragraphs.
25White collars are ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) codes
3, 4 and 5 (technicians, clerical support workers and service and sales workers), while
managers are ISCO codes 1 and 2 (managers and professionals). All other workers are
blue collars.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Males
Variable Mean Sd Min Max N
Age 0.35 0.48 0 1 3867
North 56.34 4.45 50 70 3867
Self employed 0.35 0.48 0 1 3867
Public 0.18 0.38 0 1 3867
Industry: agriculture 0.08 0.27 0 1 3867
Industry: manufacturing and construction 0.36 0.48 0 1 3867
Industry: trade 0.16 0.37 0 1 3867
Industry: transport and communication 0.07 0.25 0 1 3867
Industry: credit and insurance services 0.03 0.16 0 1 3867
Industry: general government 0.08 0.27 0 1 3867
Industry: other services 0.23 0.42 0 1 3867
White Collar 0.33 0.47 0 1 3867
Manager 0.08 0.27 0 1 3867
Married 0.96 0.19 0 1 3867
Working spouse 0.34 0.47 0 1 3849
Home owner 0.75 0.43 0 1 3586
Real house value 133418 132004 0.12 1188743 1682
Stock 0.15 0.36 0 1 3867
Fund 0.12 0.33 0 1 3867
Individual retirement account 0.10 0.30 0 1 3867
Illnesses after 50 0.08 0.26 0 1 3867
Control 0.50 0.50 0 1 3626
Effort 0.49 0.50 0 1 3626
Reward 0.61 0.49 0 1 3594
Imbalance 2.51 0.67 1 4 3594
Notes: real house value in 2011 Euro. Individual-year observations, 1993-2011.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, Females
Variable Mean Sd Min Max N
Age 0.49 0.50 0 1 1816
North 55.14 3.81 50 70 1816
Self employed 0.33 0.47 0 1 1816
Public 0.23 0.42 0 1 1816
Industry: agriculture 0.09 0.29 0 1 1816
Industry: manufacturing and construction 0.19 0.39 0 1 1816
Industry: trade 0.19 0.39 0 1 1816
Industry: transport and communication 0.00 0.06 0 1 1816
Industry: credit and insurance services 0.01 0.09 0 1 1816
Industry: general government 0.07 0.26 0 1 1816
Industry: other services 0.45 0.50 0 1 1816
White Collar 0.33 0.47 0 1 1816
Manager 0.09 0.29 0 1 1816
Married 0.95 0.23 0 1 1816
Working spouse 0.46 0.50 0 1 1782
Home owner 0.78 0.42 0 1 1790
Real house value 153527 129548 0.17 751415 764
Stock 0.09 0.28 0 1 1816
Fund 0.10 0.30 0 1 1816
Individual retirement account 0.07 0.25 0 1 1816
Illnesses after 50 0.06 0.24 0 1 1816
Control 0.50 0.50 0 1 1732
Effort 0.44 0.50 0 1 1732
Reward 0.63 0.48 0 1 1714
Imbalance 2.40 0.69 1 4 1714
Notes: real house value in 2011 Euro. Individual-year observations, 1993-2011.
36
7.1 Wealth
As already noticed by Gruber and Wise (2004): “In principle, total wealth
should be controlled for, but in most countries the data do not provide
measures of other forms of wealth”. SHARELIFE, on the contrary, in-
cludes a financial history section and an accommodation section.
In the financial history section, information is collected about invest-
ments individuals may have made during their life. These questions only
regard the types of investment, not the amount invested. Specifically, re-
spondents are asked if they ever invested in either stocks (or shares) or
mutual funds, if they ever had a retirement account, if they have ever
taken out a life insurance policy or if they ever owned any business. For
each of these items, the year they were first acquired is also asked.
These information are used to construct three dummy variables taking
up value one in the year the individuals report having acquired stocks or
shares, funds, a retirement account or a life insurance policy. As shown
in Table 5, around 16% of females invested in stocks or shares, 13% in
mutual funds and 9% have an individual retirement account. In Tables 6
it is shown instead that around 8% of females invested in stocks or shares,
11% in mutual funds and 5% have an individual retirement account.
Another section of SHARELIFE contains instead information about the
different places individuals have lived in during their life. In particular,
respondents are asked about the residences they lived in for more than six
months, the year they started living in the accommodation, if they owned
it and, if they purchased it, the price of the property 26. It is not possible
to know the market value of residences that were received as a gift or
bequest, but it is still possible to control for home ownership27.
Market house value has been calculated by using house prices growth
26In case any property is sold, the sale price is asked as well. Besides, in each wave
respondents are asked how much, in their opinion, would they receive if they sold their
property.
27The observations for which house value is not known because the house was re-
ceived as a gift or bequest will be treated as missing observations.
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for Italy, derived from residential property price statistics collected from
national sources of various countries by the Bank for International Set-
tlements. Here the long series on nominal residential property prices is
exploited, which is available for Italy at a quarterly frequency starting in
1971 28. Finally, as for the other monetary values, house value is expressed
in 2011 Euro. In Table 5 and 6 it is shown that around 73% of men and
78% of women are home owners and that the average real house value is
around 133000 Euro for men and 148000 Euro for women.
7.2 Health
A substantial number of studies show that health is an important deter-
minant of labour market status (see, for example, Haan and Myck (2009))
and retirement choice (Blundell et al., 2002; Disney et al., 2006). As is
well-known, health measures, especially if self-assessed, suffer from vari-
ous problems. For example, two identical individuals could perceive their
health differently and thus self-assess health differently. A poor health
condition may also influence other labour outcomes, like wages: this means
that a shock to health may determine both income and substitution effects
on labour supply, which complicates the effect of health on labour market
status (Disney et al., 2006). Besides, reverse causality is possible between
health and labour market status.
One possibility is to substitute self-assessed measures with more ob-
jective measures of health. These, most of the times, are still self-reported
and usually refers to specific health conditions or difficulties in perform-
ing certain tasks. As noted by Bound (1991) and reiterated in Disney et al.
(2006), “we cannot be sure that such proxies are any better predictors of
(in)activity than self-reported health status, as the researcher thereby as-
sumes some link between work status and these other health measures”
(Disney et al., 2006). However, the information available in SHARELIFE
28Due to unreported values and to the fact that the price index is available only starting
from 1971, around 18% of observations are lost when controlling for real house value.
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only allows to follow the “objective” approach.
In the health section of SHARELIFE, respondents are asked how many
periods of ill health or disability they experienced in adulthood that lasted
for more than a year (including serious illnesses that lasted less than one
year, but influenced the respondent’s daily life for more than a year). Then,
the year when the illness periods started and ended is asked, as well as the
type of illness among a number of conditions.
This information may be exploited in various ways. First, a dummy
could be created that takes value one for the length of each illness period.
However, it seems more reasonable to assume that serious illness peri-
ods experienced in adulthood have long term effects on the probability of
retirement, which is something that has been overlooked in the economic
literature. An example in epidemiological literature is Avedano and Mack-
enbach (2011): the authors measure the effect of experiencing at least one
period of illness in adulthood on survival time in the labour market, and
illness is treated as a time-varying variable taking up value one from the
year the first illness was experienced.
The approach followed in this paper will be to construct a dummy
variable for the experience of illness periods taking up value one from the
year the first illness was experienced. Besides, as illness periods closer
to the ages at risk of retirement may be more important for the choice of
retirement than illness periods experienced much earlier in life, another
dummy variable will be created taking up value one from the start of any
illness period experienced after the age of 50. Table 5 and 6 show that 8%
of men and 7% of women experienced at least one serious illness after the
age of 50.
7.3 Work Quality
The impact of quality of work on labour supply has been largely neglected
by the economic literature. Two non-recent exceptions are Atrostic (1982)
and Altonji and Paxson (1986). The former incorporates non-pecuniary job
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characteristics into a neoclassical consumer demand system, and shows
that this leads to different wage and income elasticities of labour supply.
The latter instead shows that the characteristics of specific jobs influence
working hours of individuals. A more recent example is Kunze and Suppa
(2013), who using Australian data (HILDA) show that elasticities differ
systematically among individuals with good and bad job characteristics
and that omitting job characteristics from labour supply models imply
both larger wage and income elasticities.
Some evidence on the effect of quality of work using SHARE data may
be found in the health literature in Siegrist et al. (2006) and in the eco-
nomic literature in Schnalzenberger et al. (2014). The former work finds
a strong relation between work quality and intention of early retirement
for individuals older than 50, even after controlling for well-being. The
latter studies the relationship of various measures of job quality with ac-
tual retirement and finds that there is some evidence (but not for all mea-
sures) that poor employment quality decreases retirement age, especially
for women.
This is the first paper that uses some measures of work quality in an
option value model of retirement, as all other papers in the literature only
looked at the effect of financial incentives and job quality separately. This
seems important because Schnalzenberger et al. (2014) find that there is a
discrepancy in the effect of job quality measures on the intention to retire
and on actual retirement. This may be due to the fact that retiring at spe-
cific ages implies costs or benefits that are not taken into consideration in
their analysis. Besides, controlling for health when controlling for work
quality seems important as evidence shows that poor quality of employ-
ment is associated with poor health (Siegrist et al., 2005), and the causal
direction may hold both ways.
The questions about work quality in the work history section of SHARE-
LIFE refers to the current (for those who are not yet retired) or main job.
The 12 questions are taken from the original questionnaires of two work
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stress models that received most attention recently: the demand-control
model (Karasek et al., 1998) and the effort-reward imbalance (ERI) model
(Siegrist et al., 1996). The first model identifies stressful work by job task
profiles that are characterized by high demand in combination with low
control, while the second measures the imbalance between high efforts
spent and low rewards received in turn, in terms of money, esteem, career
prospects and job security (Siegrist et al., 2006). Not all items from the
demand-control and effort-reward imbalance models have been included
in the SHARE questionnaire: control has been favoured over demand, and
as regards the ERI model two items for effort and five elements for reward
were included. Here, effort is measured using measures of both physical
and psychosocial demand and reward using both reward and social sup-
port at work items (see Siegrist and Wahrendorf, 2011). Table 7 show the
items used as measures of quality of work as they appear in the SHARE-
LIFE questionnaire.
Table 7: Measures of Quality of Work
Dimension Item (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
Control 1. I have very little freedom to decide how to do my work
2. I have an opportunity to develop new skills
Effort 3. My job is physically demanding
4. My immediate work environment is uncomfortable
5. I am under constant time pressure due to a heavy workload
Reward 6. I receive the recognition I deserve for my work
7. Considering all my efforts and achievements, my salary is adequate
8. I receive adequate support in difficult situations
There are four possible answers ranging from strongly agree (indicator
1) to strongly disagree (indicator 4), that is, the 12 items are 4-point Likert
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scaled. As in Siegrist et al. (2006), low control is measured by the sum
score of two items ranging from 2 to 8 (here, higher scores indicate higher
control at work) and the upper tertile is taken as indicator of high control
at work. ERI is instead defined by a ratio of the sum score of the “effort”
items (nominator) and of the sum score of the “reward” items (adjusted
for number or items, denominator). The ratio can then be transformed
into a binary variable equal to 1 for those with higher effort than reward,
or transformed in a continuous measure from which quartiles may be de-
fined (see Siegrist et al., 2004) 29. Descriptive statistics for control, effort,
reward and imbalance variables are presented in Table 5 and 6 for males
and females respectively.
8 Results
Each regression table in this section presents either four or five columns.
Column (1) shows the linear probability model estimated by fixed effect
and it appears only in the basic specification, as this method only allows
time-varying controls. Column (2) shows a probit model estimated by
pooled MLE. The implicit assumption of this model is that the individual
effect ci is independent of xi. Column (3) shows a probit model estimated
by full MLE. The implicit assumptions here are both that the individual
effect ci is independent of xi and conditional independence. Column (4)
shows a correlated random effect probit model estimated by pooled MLE.
This model assumes that the individual effect is correlated with financial
incentives. Here, this correlation is modelled through the first observation
of two financial variables, expected wage and pensionable earnings. This
29As noticed by Siegrist et al. (2004), transforming logarithmically the variable in a
continuous measure provides more information and allows to construct quartiles or ter-
tiles of the ratio. This may be done (see Pikhart et al., 2001) by placing the result 1 at the
center of the scale. Then by using quartiles four categories emerge: 1 (effort-reward ratio
of 0.25 to 0.5), 2 (ERI ratio 0.5 to 1), 3 (ERI ratio 1 to 2) and 4 (ERI ratio 2 to 4). Effort
reward imbalance becomes stronger as the score increases.
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is implemented simply by adding these two time constant variables to the
specification. Then, one can test the random effect probit model by testing
the joint significance of these two variables. Finally, column (5) shows a
correlated random effect probit model estimated by full MLE, where the
conditional independence assumption is also needed.
As mentioned above, what all these models have in common is the
possibility of estimating average partial effects. Thus, in each table APEs
are shown next to the coefficients. Besides, tables progressively present
an increased number of controls, added on top of previous ones. Finally,
results are presented separately for males and females.
First of all, SSW and the marginal incentive measures (ACC and PV)
always have the expected signs: a positive change in SSW increases the
probability of retirement while a positive change in ACC or PV reduces
the probability of retirement. The only case that displays an unexpected
sign is the linear probability model fixed effect model, where SSW assumes
a negative sign. However, in this model SSW is almost never significant
and the two incentives measures are never jointly significant. In all other
models and throughout different specifications, incentives measures are
significant in most of the cases and always jointly significant.
Table 8 and 10 for males and Table 18 and 20 for females shows the
most basic specification where age enters linearly. However, specifications
where age enters non-linearly through age dummies are to be preferred.
The reason is that evidence shows that workers tend to retire at specific
ages, generally at the age of benefit eligibility which sometimes also estab-
lishes social norm for retirement (see Gruber and Wise, 2004), and a linear
age variable would fail to capture this effect. For this reason, all other
specifications will include age dummies.
As regards males, in the basic specification (Tables 8 to 11), controls in-
clude expected wage, pensionable earnings, area, dummies for self-employed
and public workers, industry dummies and dummies for white-collar work-
ers and managers (in column (4) and (5) variables containing the first in-
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dividual observation of expected wage and pensionable earnings are in-
cluded as well). As indicated by the average partial effect of SSW, aAC10000
increase in SSW increases the probability of retirement by 0.06 to 0.11 per-
centage points. Results for the marginal incentives indicate that a AC10000
increase in the accrual reduces the probability of retirement by 0.12 to 0.19
pps, while the same increase in the peak value reduces the probability of
retirement by 0.13 to 0.21 pps.
In Table 12 and 13 other wealth variables are added to SSW: specifi-
cally, dummies indicating ownership of house, stocks, funds and individ-
ual retirement account, as well as housing wealth. A dummy indicating if
the spouse is currently working is added as well. The effect of the accrual
and peak value variables is reinforced and determine a reduction in the
probability of retirement up to 0.26 and 0.28 pps. Having an individual re-
tirement account or a working spouse seems to have a significant effect in
the direction of reducing retirement probabilities. The negative sign on re-
tirement account may be explained by the fact that these plans are purely
defined contribution (besides, contributions are deductible from total in-
come), so that the final complementary pension depends on the amount
of contributions paid and on the length of the contribution period. The
negative sign on the dummy for having a working wife may indicate com-
plementarity of leisure from the side of husbands.
Table 16 and 17 add, on the top of previous controls, a health variable
and some job quality variables. SSW and marginal incentives variables
are in line with previous results. Both having experienced a serious ill-
ness after the age of 50 and having a job which exerts effort are significant
predictors of earlier retirement 30.
Table 18 to 21 show results for females in the basic specification, with
30In Table 14 and 15 results are presented for specifications which only adds the health
and job quality variables to the basic specification. In this case, reward is significant as
well and has a positive sign. However, significance disappears once wealth variables
are added to the model, probably meaning that reward is already captured by financial
variables.
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and without age dummies. Females are more responsive than men to fi-
nancial incentives: a AC10000 increase in SSW increases the probability of
retirement by 0.14 to 0.19 percentage points. Results for the marginal in-
centives indicate that a AC10000 increase in the accrual reduces the proba-
bility of retirement by 0.34 to 0.69 pps, while the same increase in the peak
value reduces the probability of retirement by 0.13 to 0.57 pps.
Table 22 and 23 show results when controlling for other wealth and
having a working husband. Only stock ownership seems to have a posi-
tive effect on the probability of retirement. Besides, differently from males,
females do not seem to be responsive to their husband working condi-
tion: this could suggest asymmetries in complementarity of leisure be-
tween males and females. The effect of marginal incentives measure gets
stronger in this specification, up to 1.38 and 0.28 for accrual and peak value
respectively. Table 26 and 27 add job quality measures to the specification,
showing that reward seems to positively affect the probability of retire-
ment for females.
In all the models estimated by full MLE, ρ, the proportion of the total
variance contributed by the panel-level variance component is small, and
becomes zero in the full specifications, meaning that the panel estimator
is not different from the pooled estimator. This suggests that the controls
introduced are sufficient to explain heterogeneity in the retirement choice
among individuals.
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Table 8: Estimates for retirement, males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0023* 0.0094*** 0.0010 0.0103*** 0.0011 0.0095*** 0.0010 0.0103*** 0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0036)
ACC -0.0035* -0.0104 -0.0012 -0.0111 -0.0012 -0.0120 -0.0013 -0.0130 -0.0013
(0.0019) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0108) (0.0096)
Age 0.0199*** 0.0878*** 0.0098 0.1060*** 0.0112 0.0888*** 0.0096 0.1034*** 0.0107
(0.0022) (0.0095) (0.0215) (0.0101) (0.0207)
Expected wage -0.0017 0.0018 0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0325 -0.0035 -0.0328 -0.0034
(0.0042) (0.0231) (0.0196) (0.0269) (0.0228)
Pensionable earnings 0.0326*** -0.0514 -0.0057 -0.0542 -0.0057 0.0358 0.0039 0.0416 0.0043
(0.0115) (0.0386) (0.0348) (0.0606) (0.0630)
North 0.2028** 0.0232 0.2270** 0.0248 0.1848** 0.0206 0.2052** 0.0219
(0.0867) (0.0989) (0.0870) (0.0977)
Self-employed -0.5020*** -0.0492 -0.5640*** -0.0519 -0.5144*** -0.0490 -0.5630*** -0.0507
(0.1101) (0.1387) (0.1116) (0.1348)
Public worker 0.2235* 0.0268 0.2554* 0.0294 0.2333* 0.0274 0.2595* 0.0293
(0.1291) (0.1495) (0.1299) (0.1466)
Agriculture -0.2936 -0.0280 -0.3473 -0.0307 -0.3807* -0.0338 -0.4356* -0.0360
(0.2054) (0.2232) (0.2147) (0.2268)
Building 0.0424 0.0048 0.0370 0.0039 0.0426 0.0047 0.0372 0.0039
(0.1221) (0.1327) (0.1229) (0.1307)
Retail -0.0967 -0.0103 -0.1059 -0.0106 -0.0612 -0.0064 -0.0684 -0.0069
(0.1639) (0.1781) (0.1629) (0.1752)
Transport -0.2019 -0.0199 -0.1974 -0.0186 -0.1891 -0.0183 -0.1835 -0.0171
(0.1846) (0.1913) (0.1853) (0.1879)
Credit services 0.2479 0.0322 0.2735 0.0341 0.2722 0.0350 0.2953 0.0366
(0.1980) (0.2540) (0.1964) (0.2498)
General government -0.1376 -0.0142 -0.1523 -0.0148 -0.1341 -0.0135 -0.1469 -0.0140
(0.1708) (0.2030) (0.1696) (0.1987)
White collar -0.2085** -0.0224 -0.2531** -0.0257 -0.2322** -0.0243 -0.2723** -0.0271
(0.0940) (0.1179) (0.0955) (0.1178)
Manager -0.3681** -0.0334 -0.4452** -0.0371 -0.3602** -0.0321 -0.4243** -0.0350
(0.1537) (0.2064) (0.1522) (0.2028)
N 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945
Rho 0.47 . . 0.11 0.11 . . 0.10 0.10
Age dummies No No No No No No No No No
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 9: Estimates for retirement, males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0019 0.0082** 0.0009 0.0082*** 0.0009 0.0065** 0.0007 0.0065** 0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030)
ACC -0.0036* -0.0135 -0.0015 -0.0135 -0.0015 -0.0169 -0.0019 -0.0169* -0.0019
(0.0019) (0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0120) (0.0089)
Expected wage -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0360 -0.0041 -0.0360 -0.0041
(0.0041) (0.0231) (0.0183) (0.0297) (0.0220)
Pensionable earnings 0.0325*** -0.0370 -0.0040 -0.0370 -0.0040 0.1048 0.0118 0.1048* 0.0118
(0.0117) (0.0386) (0.0312) (0.0641) (0.0580)
North 0.2284*** 0.0255 0.2284*** 0.0255 0.1713** 0.0198 0.1712** 0.0198
(0.0863) (0.0851) (0.0801) (0.0830)
Self-employed -0.4489*** -0.0433 -0.4489*** -0.0433 -0.3391*** -0.0348 -0.3391*** -0.0348
(0.1080) (0.1075) (0.0993) (0.1018)
Public worker 0.2099 0.0244 0.2099 0.0244 0.2387** 0.0293 0.2387* 0.0293
(0.1295) (0.1296) (0.1172) (0.1250)
Agriculture -0.3203 -0.0294 -0.3202 -0.0294 -0.2801 -0.0270 -0.2800 -0.0270
(0.2012) (0.1948) (0.2039) (0.1902)
Building 0.0241 0.0026 0.0241 0.0026 0.0304 0.0035 0.0304 0.0035
(0.1205) (0.1184) (0.1112) (0.1148)
Retail -0.1484 -0.0150 -0.1483 -0.0150 -0.1134 -0.0121 -0.1134 -0.0121
(0.1610) (0.1587) (0.1504) (0.1528)
Transport -0.2440 -0.0229 -0.2440 -0.0229 -0.2044 -0.0203 -0.2044 -0.0203
(0.1848) (0.1696) (0.1632) (0.1652)
Credit services 0.2517 0.0318 0.2517 0.0318 0.2515 0.0333 0.2515 0.0333
(0.1947) (0.2187) (0.1804) (0.2140)
General government -0.1192 -0.0121 -0.1192 -0.0121 -0.1691 -0.0173 -0.1691 -0.0173
(0.1675) (0.1771) (0.1588) (0.1740)
White collar -0.1955** -0.0205 -0.1954** -0.0205 -0.2454*** -0.0265 -0.2453** -0.0265
(0.0933) (0.0970) (0.0897) (0.0955)
Manager -0.4211*** -0.0363 -0.4211** -0.0363 -0.3062** -0.0290 -0.3061* -0.0290
(0.1497) (0.1731) (0.1516) (0.1618)
N 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945
Rho 0.47 . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
47
Table 10: Estimates for retirement, males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0022 0.0087** 0.0010 0.0096*** 0.0010 0.0089*** 0.0010 0.0097*** 0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0036)
PV -0.0025* -0.0115 -0.0013 -0.0129 -0.0013 -0.0124 -0.0013 -0.0138 -0.0014
(0.0014) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0086)
Age 0.0197*** 0.0864*** 0.0095 0.1055*** 0.0110 0.0877*** 0.0094 0.1031*** 0.0106
(0.0022) (0.0097) (0.0217) (0.0101) (0.0208)
Expected wage -0.0019 0.0093 0.0010 0.0094 0.0010 -0.0246 -0.0026 -0.0244 -0.0025
(0.0046) (0.0264) (0.0216) (0.0294) (0.0244)
Pensionable earnings 0.0301*** -0.0540 -0.0059 -0.0567 -0.0059 0.0260 0.0028 0.0323 0.0033
(0.0116) (0.0405) (0.0353) (0.0603) (0.0629)
North 0.2010** 0.0227 0.2265** 0.0243 0.1821** 0.0201 0.2033** 0.0214
(0.0867) (0.0997) (0.0870) (0.0983)
Self-employed -0.5007*** -0.0483 -0.5674*** -0.0512 -0.5149*** -0.0484 -0.5672*** -0.0502
(0.1103) (0.1404) (0.1119) (0.1364)
Public worker 0.2246* 0.0266 0.2575* 0.0291 0.2351* 0.0274 0.2623* 0.0293
(0.1292) (0.1509) (0.1301) (0.1479)
Agriculture -0.2792 -0.0263 -0.3331 -0.0291 -0.3669* -0.0324 -0.4234* -0.0347
(0.2077) (0.2256) (0.2162) (0.2289)
Building 0.0493 0.0055 0.0446 0.0047 0.0496 0.0054 0.0447 0.0046
(0.1224) (0.1340) (0.1234) (0.1318)
Retail -0.0936 -0.0098 -0.1024 -0.0101 -0.0552 -0.0058 -0.0618 -0.0061
(0.1644) (0.1796) (0.1637) (0.1766)
Transport -0.1974 -0.0192 -0.1910 -0.0178 -0.1846 -0.0178 -0.1773 -0.0164
(0.1849) (0.1928) (0.1857) (0.1893)
Credit services 0.2455 0.0314 0.2713 0.0332 0.2697 0.0343 0.2930 0.0359
(0.1967) (0.2558) (0.1952) (0.2512)
General government -0.1449 -0.0146 -0.1605 -0.0153 -0.1403 -0.0139 -0.1542 -0.0145
(0.1709) (0.2048) (0.1694) (0.2001)
White collar -0.2033** -0.0216 -0.2498** -0.0249 -0.2261** -0.0235 -0.2680** -0.0263
(0.0943) (0.1188) (0.0958) (0.1185)
Manager -0.3528** -0.0319 -0.4305** -0.0355 -0.3445** -0.0306 -0.4089** -0.0336
(0.1561) (0.2081) (0.1548) (0.2044)
N 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945
Rho 0.46 . . 0.12 0.12 . . 0.10 0.10
Age dummies No No No No No No No No No
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 11: Estimates for retirement, males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0017 0.0074** 0.0008 0.0074** 0.0008 0.0054* 0.0006 0.0054* 0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030)
PV -0.0024* -0.0144* -0.0015 -0.0144* -0.0015 -0.0192** -0.0021 -0.0192** -0.0021
(0.0013) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0095) (0.0078)
Expected wage -0.0023 0.0071 0.0008 0.0071 0.0008 -0.0224 -0.0025 -0.0224 -0.0025
(0.0046) (0.0265) (0.0203) (0.0326) (0.0235)
Pensionable earnings 0.0295** -0.0398 -0.0043 -0.0398 -0.0043 0.0884 0.0099 0.0884 0.0099
(0.0115) (0.0406) (0.0315) (0.0644) (0.0579)
North 0.2267*** 0.0250 0.2267*** 0.0250 0.1684** 0.0192 0.1683** 0.0192
(0.0863) (0.0852) (0.0803) (0.0831)
Self-employed -0.4462*** -0.0424 -0.4463*** -0.0424 -0.3412*** -0.0346 -0.3412*** -0.0346
(0.1083) (0.1074) (0.0997) (0.1019)
Public worker 0.2118 0.0243 0.2118 0.0243 0.2422** 0.0294 0.2421* 0.0294
(0.1296) (0.1301) (0.1176) (0.1258)
Agriculture -0.3015 -0.0275 -0.3015 -0.0275 -0.2574 -0.0249 -0.2574 -0.0249
(0.2036) (0.1960) (0.2057) (0.1917)
Building 0.0326 0.0035 0.0326 0.0035 0.0436 0.0049 0.0436 0.0049
(0.1210) (0.1187) (0.1123) (0.1153)
Retail -0.1456 -0.0145 -0.1456 -0.0145 -0.1030 -0.0109 -0.1030 -0.0109
(0.1616) (0.1589) (0.1520) (0.1533)
Transport -0.2391 -0.0222 -0.2391 -0.0222 -0.1957 -0.0193 -0.1957 -0.0194
(0.1852) (0.1696) (0.1642) (0.1652)
Credit services 0.2485 0.0309 0.2485 0.0309 0.2494 0.0326 0.2493 0.0326
(0.1936) (0.2186) (0.1792) (0.2140)
General government -0.1284 -0.0128 -0.1285 -0.0128 -0.1781 -0.0179 -0.1780 -0.0179
(0.1676) (0.1773) (0.1587) (0.1741)
White collar -0.1902** -0.0197 -0.1903* -0.0197 -0.2359*** -0.0253 -0.2358** -0.0253
(0.0936) (0.0971) (0.0903) (0.0956)
Manager -0.4046*** -0.0347 -0.4046** -0.0347 -0.2820* -0.0268 -0.2819* -0.0268
(0.1521) (0.1743) (0.1552) (0.1634)
N 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945
Rho 0.46 . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 12: Estimates for retirement, males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0102*** 0.0011 0.0102*** 0.0011 0.0076** 0.0008 0.0076** 0.0008
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0037)
ACC -0.0133 -0.0014 -0.0133 -0.0014 -0.0235 -0.0026 -0.0235** -0.0026
(0.0145) (0.0116) (0.0161) (0.0119)
North 0.3161*** 0.0347 0.3161*** 0.0347 0.2550** 0.0284 0.2550** 0.0284
(0.1093) (0.1076) (0.1000) (0.1042)
Expected wage -0.0124 -0.0013 -0.0124 -0.0013 -0.0613* -0.0067 -0.0613** -0.0067
(0.0275) (0.0232) (0.0363) (0.0280)
Pensionable earnings -0.0286 -0.0031 -0.0286 -0.0031 0.1697** 0.0186 0.1697** 0.0186
(0.0408) (0.0383) (0.0853) (0.0838)
Self-employed -0.3250** -0.0320 -0.3250** -0.0320 -0.2226* -0.0229 -0.2226 -0.0229
(0.1360) (0.1424) (0.1212) (0.1357)
Public worker 0.3911*** 0.0476 0.3911** 0.0476 0.3731*** 0.0465 0.3731** 0.0465
(0.1452) (0.1583) (0.1349) (0.1535)
Agriculture -0.4285 -0.0367 -0.4285 -0.0367 -0.5658* -0.0452 -0.5657** -0.0452
(0.2832) (0.2772) (0.3109) (0.2813)
Building -0.1055 -0.0110 -0.1055 -0.0110 -0.1369 -0.0145 -0.1369 -0.0144
(0.1532) (0.1463) (0.1399) (0.1429)
Retail -0.2385 -0.0232 -0.2385 -0.0232 -0.1758 -0.0178 -0.1757 -0.0178
(0.1928) (0.1911) (0.1760) (0.1830)
Transport -0.5749*** -0.0456 -0.5749*** -0.0456 -0.4868*** -0.0407 -0.4868** -0.0407
(0.2090) (0.2121) (0.1837) (0.2033)
Credit services 0.4111** 0.0554 0.4111 0.0554 0.3892** 0.0534 0.3892 0.0534
(0.1830) (0.2685) (0.1797) (0.2650)
General government -0.3184 -0.0291 -0.3183 -0.0291 -0.3230 -0.0298 -0.3230 -0.0298
(0.2125) (0.2297) (0.2071) (0.2258)
White collar -0.2056* -0.0215 -0.2056* -0.0215 -0.2574** -0.0273 -0.2573** -0.0273
(0.1190) (0.1207) (0.1142) (0.1189)
Manager -0.9222*** -0.0618 -0.9222*** -0.0618 -0.7747*** -0.0558 -0.7746*** -0.0557
(0.2383) (0.2766) (0.2347) (0.2559)
Home owner 0.1409 0.0165 0.1409 0.0165 0.1667* 0.0203 0.1667 0.0203
(0.1042) (0.1084) (0.0975) (0.1064)
Housing wealth -0.0011*** -0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0009* -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0039)
Stock -0.0375 -0.0040 -0.0375 -0.0040 -0.1081 -0.0113 -0.1081 -0.0113
(0.1629) (0.1579) (0.1556) (0.1565)
Fund 0.2362 0.0281 0.2361 0.0281 0.2618* 0.0324 0.2617* 0.0324
(0.1606) (0.1505) (0.1506) (0.1488)
Retirement fund -0.3725** -0.0329 -0.3725* -0.0329 -0.4142** -0.0362 -0.4141** -0.0362
(0.1714) (0.2020) (0.1617) (0.1979)
Working spouse -0.2028* -0.0192 -0.2028* -0.0192 -0.2795*** -0.0254 -0.2794** -0.0254
(0.1118) (0.1137) (0.1081) (0.1102)
N 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 13: Estimates for retirement, males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0093** 0.0010 0.0093** 0.0010 0.0064* 0.0007 0.0064* 0.0007
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0037)
PV -0.0154 -0.0016 -0.0154 -0.0016 -0.0257** -0.0028 -0.0257** -0.0028
(0.0116) (0.0100) (0.0128) (0.0100)
North 0.3140*** 0.0341 0.3140*** 0.0341 0.2520** 0.0277 0.2519** 0.0277
(0.1096) (0.1078) (0.1010) (0.1045)
Expected wage 0.0011 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0383 -0.0041 -0.0383 -0.0041
(0.0337) (0.0266) (0.0398) (0.0300)
Pensionable earnings -0.0341 -0.0036 -0.0341 -0.0036 0.1421 0.0153 0.1421* 0.0153
(0.0443) (0.0390) (0.0872) (0.0822)
Self-employed -0.3144** -0.0306 -0.3144** -0.0306 -0.2181* -0.0221 -0.2180 -0.0221
(0.1365) (0.1422) (0.1224) (0.1359)
Public worker 0.3967*** 0.0478 0.3966** 0.0478 0.3865*** 0.0477 0.3865** 0.0477
(0.1453) (0.1591) (0.1344) (0.1549)
Agriculture -0.3973 -0.0342 -0.3973 -0.0342 -0.5221* -0.0419 -0.5221* -0.0419
(0.2863) (0.2789) (0.3119) (0.2840)
Building -0.1048 -0.0108 -0.1048 -0.0108 -0.1330 -0.0139 -0.1330 -0.0139
(0.1534) (0.1467) (0.1403) (0.1437)
Retail -0.2403 -0.0230 -0.2403 -0.0230 -0.1690 -0.0170 -0.1690 -0.0170
(0.1929) (0.1913) (0.1783) (0.1838)
Transport -0.5746*** -0.0452 -0.5746*** -0.0452 -0.4840*** -0.0400 -0.4840** -0.0400
(0.2091) (0.2120) (0.1846) (0.2035)
Credit services 0.4019** 0.0532 0.4019 0.0532 0.3780** 0.0509 0.3780 0.0509
(0.1841) (0.2684) (0.1817) (0.2650)
General government -0.3360 -0.0301 -0.3360 -0.0301 -0.3469* -0.0312 -0.3469 -0.0312
(0.2139) (0.2303) (0.2077) (0.2263)
White collar -0.2044* -0.0212 -0.2044* -0.0212 -0.2529** -0.0265 -0.2529** -0.0265
(0.1195) (0.1208) (0.1142) (0.1190)
Manager -0.9125*** -0.0609 -0.9124*** -0.0609 -0.7531*** -0.0540 -0.7531*** -0.0540
(0.2429) (0.2780) (0.2460) (0.2592)
Home owner 0.1467 0.0170 0.1467 0.0170 0.1741* 0.0210 0.1741 0.0210
(0.1043) (0.1084) (0.0978) (0.1066)
Housing wealth -0.0011*** -0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0009* -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0043)
Stock -0.0453 -0.0047 -0.0453 -0.0047 -0.1211 -0.0124 -0.1211 -0.0124
(0.1639) (0.1583) (0.1569) (0.1570)
Fund 0.2377 0.0280 0.2376 0.0280 0.2660* 0.0325 0.2660* 0.0325
(0.1600) (0.1503) (0.1499) (0.1485)
Retirement fund -0.3750** -0.0328 -0.3750* -0.0328 -0.4175** -0.0360 -0.4175** -0.0360
(0.1710) (0.2014) (0.1629) (0.1974)
Working spouse -0.2070* -0.0193 -0.2070* -0.0193 -0.2794** -0.0251 -0.2794**
(0.1125) (0.1142) (0.1088) (0.1108)
N 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 14: Estimates for retirement, males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0079** 0.0008 0.0079** 0.0008 0.0059* 0.0006 0.0059* 0.0006
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031)
ACC -0.0184* -0.0020 -0.0184** -0.0020 -0.0259** -0.0028 -0.0259*** -0.0028
(0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0110) (0.0093)
North 0.2897*** 0.0322 0.2897*** 0.0322 0.2089** 0.0236 0.2089** 0.0236
(0.0896) (0.0909) (0.0839) (0.0886)
Expected wage -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0334 -0.0037 -0.0334 -0.0037
(0.0230) (0.0188) (0.0298) (0.0222)
Pensionable earnings -0.0321 -0.0034 -0.0321 -0.0034 0.1121* 0.0122 0.1121* 0.0122
(0.0381) (0.0319) (0.0636) (0.0599)
Self-employed -0.5481*** -0.0513 -0.5482*** -0.0513 -0.4148*** -0.0408 -0.4148*** -0.0408
(0.1238) (0.1187) (0.1115) (0.1119)
Public worker 0.2641* 0.0306 0.2641* 0.0306 0.2676** 0.0321 0.2676** 0.0321
(0.1370) (0.1387) (0.1248) (0.1338)
Agriculture -0.3273 -0.0297 -0.3274 -0.0297 -0.2435 -0.0233 -0.2435 -0.0233
(0.2168) (0.2044) (0.2210) (0.1982)
Building 0.0034 0.0004 0.0034 0.0004 0.0405 0.0045 0.0405 0.0045
(0.1266) (0.1264) (0.1174) (0.1227)
Retail -0.1425 -0.0142 -0.1426 -0.0142 -0.0797 -0.0084 -0.0797 -0.0084
(0.1669) (0.1659) (0.1554) (0.1595)
Transport -0.2927 -0.0264 -0.2927 -0.0264 -0.1925 -0.0187 -0.1925 -0.0187
(0.1994) (0.1831) (0.1731) (0.1770)
Credit services 0.2913 0.0368 0.2913 0.0368 0.2918* 0.0382 0.2918 0.0382
(0.1870) (0.2254) (0.1766) (0.2199)
General government -0.2413 -0.0226 -0.2413 -0.0226 -0.2444 -0.0233 -0.2444 -0.0233
(0.1807) (0.1902) (0.1672) (0.1859)
White collar -0.2186** -0.0226 -0.2186** -0.0226 -0.2346** -0.0247 -0.2346** -0.0247
(0.0990) (0.1047) (0.0965) (0.1030)
Manager -0.5285*** -0.0429 -0.5285*** -0.0429 -0.3401** -0.0309 -0.3401** -0.0309
(0.1716) (0.1836) (0.1632) (0.1704)
Ill after 50 0.3966*** 0.0525 0.3966** 0.0525 0.3710*** 0.0504 0.3710** 0.0504
(0.1450) (0.1789) (0.1379) (0.1734)
Control 0.1608* 0.0189 0.1608* 0.0189 0.1261 0.0150 0.1261 0.0150
(0.0933) (0.0942) (0.0855) (0.0914)
Effort 0.2600*** 0.0326 0.2600*** 0.0326 0.2373*** 0.0303 0.2373*** 0.0303
(0.0928) (0.0890) (0.0834) (0.0864)
Reward 0.1955** 0.0235 0.1955** 0.0235 0.2182*** 0.0276 0.2182** 0.0276
(0.0896) (0.0918) (0.0846) (0.0896)
N 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 15: Estimates for retirement, males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0071** 0.0007 0.0071** 0.0007 0.0048 0.0005 0.0048 0.0005
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031)
PV -0.0170** -0.0018 -0.0170** -0.0018 -0.0249*** -0.0027 -0.0249*** -0.0027
(0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0083)
North 0.2836*** 0.0310 0.2835*** 0.0310 0.1991** 0.0223 0.1991** 0.0223
(0.0900) (0.0909) (0.0841) (0.0888)
Expected wage 0.0066 0.0007 0.0066 0.0007 -0.0186 -0.0020 -0.0186 -0.0020
(0.0262) (0.0209) (0.0323) (0.0238)
Pensionable earnings -0.0335 -0.0035 -0.0335 -0.0035 0.0890 0.0097 0.0890 0.0097
(0.0396) (0.0323) (0.0641) (0.0594)
Self-employed -0.5450*** -0.0503 -0.5449*** -0.0503 -0.4188*** -0.0408 -0.4188*** -0.0408
(0.1239) (0.1184) (0.1118) (0.1119)
Public worker 0.2702** 0.0310 0.2702* 0.0310 0.2788** 0.0334 0.2788** 0.0334
(0.1370) (0.1392) (0.1248) (0.1347)
Agriculture -0.2941 -0.0267 -0.2941 -0.0267 -0.2043 -0.0199 -0.2043 -0.0199
(0.2194) (0.2059) (0.2224) (0.1999)
Building 0.0181 0.0019 0.0181 0.0019 0.0617 0.0068 0.0617 0.0068
(0.1276) (0.1269) (0.1184) (0.1234)
Retail -0.1338 -0.0132 -0.1338 -0.0132 -0.0594 -0.0063 -0.0594 -0.0063
(0.1680) (0.1662) (0.1576) (0.1602)
Transport -0.2859 -0.0255 -0.2859 -0.0255 -0.1842 -0.0179 -0.1842 -0.0179
(0.1996) (0.1829) (0.1742) (0.1768)
Credit services 0.2913 0.0363 0.2912 0.0363 0.2934* 0.0382 0.2934 0.0382
(0.1864) (0.2252) (0.1757) (0.2199)
General government -0.2505 -0.0231 -0.2504 -0.0231 -0.2556 -0.0241 -0.2556 -0.0241
(0.1805) (0.1903) (0.1666) (0.1860)
White collar -0.2101** -0.0214 -0.2101** -0.0214 -0.2199** -0.0231 -0.2199** -0.0231
(0.0992) (0.1047) (0.0966) (0.1030)
Manager -0.5149*** -0.0415 -0.5149*** -0.0415 -0.3210* -0.0293 -0.3210* -0.0293
(0.1740) (0.1848) (0.1682) (0.1723)
Ill after 50 0.3902*** 0.0508 0.3902** 0.0508 0.3634*** 0.0488 0.3634** 0.0488
(0.1452) (0.1789) (0.1382) (0.1736)
Control 0.1657* 0.0193 0.1656* 0.0193 0.1334 0.0158 0.1334 0.0158
(0.0933) (0.0942) (0.0857) (0.0914)
Effort 0.2577*** 0.0318 0.2577*** 0.0318 0.2352*** 0.0298 0.2352*** 0.0298
(0.0927) (0.0889) (0.0836) (0.0863)
Reward 0.1947** 0.0231 0.1947** 0.0231 0.2204*** 0.0277 0.2203** 0.0277
(0.0900) (0.0919) (0.0852) (0.0899)
N 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 16: Estimates for retirement, males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0096*** 0.0010 0.0096** 0.0010 0.0070* 0.0008 0.0070* 0.0008
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0038)
ACC -0.0138 -0.0015 -0.0138 -0.0015 -0.0218 -0.0024 -0.0218* -0.0024
(0.0137) (0.0119) (0.0154) (0.0122)
North 0.3753*** 0.0410 0.3753*** 0.0410 0.2830*** 0.0315 0.2830** 0.0315
(0.1122) (0.1144) (0.1041) (0.1106)
Expected wage -0.0150 -0.0016 -0.0150 -0.0016 -0.0485 -0.0052 -0.0485* -0.0052
(0.0262) (0.0238) (0.0337) (0.0283)
Pensionable earnings -0.0158 -0.0017 -0.0158 -0.0017 0.1365* 0.0147 0.1365 0.0147
(0.0360) (0.0389) (0.0799) (0.0847)
Self-employed -0.4576*** -0.0432 -0.4576*** -0.0432 -0.3206** -0.0319 -0.3206** -0.0319
(0.1475) (0.1617) (0.1320) (0.1529)
Public worker 0.4307*** 0.0521 0.4307** 0.0521 0.4010*** 0.0496 0.4010** 0.0496
(0.1559) (0.1681) (0.1444) (0.1623)
Agriculture -0.4907* -0.0405 -0.4907* -0.0405 -0.5803* -0.0459 -0.5802** -0.0459
(0.2944) (0.2893) (0.3153) (0.2908)
Building -0.1436 -0.0146 -0.1436 -0.0146 -0.1555 -0.0161 -0.1554 -0.0161
(0.1584) (0.1584) (0.1429) (0.1544)
Retail -0.2277 -0.0219 -0.2277 -0.0219 -0.1550 -0.0157 -0.1550 -0.0157
(0.1992) (0.2017) (0.1831) (0.1923)
Transport -0.5183** -0.0419 -0.5184** -0.0419 -0.4036** -0.0349 -0.4036* -0.0349
(0.2262) (0.2208) (0.1945) (0.2112)
Credit services 0.3602* 0.0461 0.3602 0.0461 0.3553** 0.0471 0.3553 0.0471
(0.1950) (0.2743) (0.1813) (0.2703)
General government -0.4682** -0.0393 -0.4682* -0.0393 -0.4218* -0.0366 -0.4218* -0.0366
(0.2310) (0.2522) (0.2177) (0.2447)
White collar -0.2063* -0.0213 -0.2063 -0.0213 -0.2295* -0.0242 -0.2294* -0.0242
(0.1219) (0.1270) (0.1188) (0.1248)
Manager -0.9754*** -0.0640 -0.9755*** -0.0640 -0.7677*** -0.0554 -0.7676*** -0.0554
(0.2496) (0.2847) (0.2382) (0.2602)
Home owner 0.1145 0.0129 0.1145 0.0129 0.1491 0.0177 0.1491 0.0177
(0.1105) (0.1173) (0.1037) (0.1148)
Housing wealth -0.0011*** -0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0006) (0.0054)
Stock -0.0309 -0.0032 -0.0309 -0.0032 -0.0980 -0.0101 -0.0980 -0.0101
(0.1634) (0.1639) (0.1560) (0.1620)
Fund 0.2994* 0.0359 0.2995* 0.0359 0.3379** 0.0427 0.3378** 0.0427
(0.1697) (0.1613) (0.1583) (0.1587)
Retirement fund -0.3648** -0.0320 -0.3649* -0.0320 -0.4612** -0.0390 -0.4611** -0.0390
(0.1856) (0.2144) (0.1794) (0.2138)
Working spouse -0.1766 -0.0167 -0.1766 -0.0167 -0.2452** -0.0226 -0.2451** -0.0226
(0.1191) (0.1188) (0.1152) (0.1145)
Ill after 50 0.4397*** 0.0578 0.4397** 0.0578 0.4052*** 0.0544 0.4051** 0.0544
(0.1635) (0.2051) (0.1564) (0.1991)
Control 0.1846 0.0217 0.1846 0.0217 0.1384 0.0163 0.1384 0.0163
(0.1205) (0.1249) (0.1104) (0.1213)
Effort 0.3132*** 0.0396 0.3132*** 0.0396 0.2689*** 0.0343 0.2689** 0.0343
(0.1144) (0.1176) (0.1040) (0.1139)
Reward 0.1393 0.0160 0.1393 0.0160 0.1433 0.0169 0.1432 0.0169
(0.1135) (0.1150) (0.1073) (0.1119)
N 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 17: Estimates for retirement, males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0088** 0.0009 0.0088** 0.0009 0.0059 0.0006 0.0059 0.0006
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0038)
PV -0.0135 -0.0014 -0.0135 -0.0014 -0.0234* -0.0025 -0.0234** -0.0025
(0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0103)
North 0.3694*** 0.0399 0.3694*** 0.0399 0.2718*** 0.0296 0.2717** 0.0296
(0.1129) (0.1147) (0.1048) (0.1111)
Expected wage -0.0047 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0005 -0.0281 -0.0030 -0.0281 -0.0030
(0.0315) (0.0273) (0.0370) (0.0302)
Pensionable earnings -0.0192 -0.0020 -0.0192 -0.0020 0.1119 0.0119 0.1118 0.0119
(0.0385) (0.0396) (0.0809) (0.0830)
Self-employed -0.4522*** -0.0423 -0.4523*** -0.0423 -0.3253** -0.0317 -0.3253** -0.0317
(0.1483) (0.1611) (0.1337) (0.1529)
Public worker 0.4376*** 0.0524 0.4376*** 0.0524 0.4196*** 0.0513 0.4195** 0.0513
(0.1565) (0.1686) (0.1445) (0.1634)
Agriculture -0.4499 -0.0374 -0.4499 -0.0374 -0.5182 -0.0414 -0.5182* -0.0414
(0.2978) (0.2912) (0.3164) (0.2936)
Building -0.1344 -0.0136 -0.1344 -0.0136 -0.1410 -0.0144 -0.1409 -0.0144
(0.1598) (0.1585) (0.1439) (0.1550)
Retail -0.2205 -0.0210 -0.2205 -0.0210 -0.1335 -0.0134 -0.1336 -0.0134
(0.2002) (0.2019) (0.1857) (0.1931)
Transport -0.5145** -0.0412 -0.5145** -0.0412 -0.3964** -0.0338 -0.3964* -0.0338
(0.2262) (0.2205) (0.1954) (0.2109)
Credit services 0.3573* 0.0452 0.3574 0.0452 0.3555* 0.0462 0.3555 0.0462
(0.1956) (0.2742) (0.1825) (0.2704)
General government -0.4808** -0.0397 -0.4808* -0.0397 -0.4414** -0.0372 -0.4413* -0.0372
(0.2323) (0.2527) (0.2182) (0.2449)
White collar -0.2023* -0.0206 -0.2023 -0.0206 -0.2221* -0.0230 -0.2221* -0.0230
(0.1218) (0.1269) (0.1185) (0.1247)
Manager -0.9673*** -0.0630 -0.9674*** -0.0630 -0.7473*** -0.0534 -0.7471*** -0.0534
(0.2539) (0.2859) (0.2508) (0.2632)
Home owner 0.1214 0.0136 0.1214 0.0136 0.1563 0.0183 0.1563 0.0183
(0.1108) (0.1174) (0.1040) (0.1150)
Housing wealth -0.0011*** -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0067)
Stock -0.0356 -0.0037 -0.0357 -0.0037 -0.1099 -0.0111 -0.1099 -0.0111
(0.1644) (0.1639) (0.1575) (0.1625)
Fund 0.3003* 0.0357 0.3004* 0.0357 0.3386** 0.0420 0.3385** 0.0420
(0.1690) (0.1607) (0.1577) (0.1580)
Retirement fund -0.3700** -0.0321 -0.3700* -0.0321 -0.4660*** -0.0386 -0.4658** -0.0386
(0.1861) (0.2139) (0.1802) (0.2134)
Ill after 50 0.4300*** 0.0556 0.4301** 0.0556 0.3918** 0.0513 0.3918** 0.0513
(0.1641) (0.2051) (0.1571) (0.1996)
Control 0.1909 0.0223 0.1909 0.0223 0.1529 0.0178 0.1529 0.0178
(0.1210) (0.1249) (0.1112) (0.1216)
Effort 0.3081*** 0.0384 0.3081*** 0.0384 0.2627** 0.0328 0.2627** 0.0328
(0.1143) (0.1175) (0.1038) (0.1141)
Reward 0.1368 0.0155 0.1368 0.0155 0.1424 0.0165 0.1424 0.0165
(0.1140) (0.1151) (0.1083) (0.1122)
Working spouse -0.0166 -0.1771 -0.0166 -0.2406** -0.0218 -0.2406** -0.0218
(0.1190) (0.1159) (0.1149)
N 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 18: Estimates for retirement, females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0072*** 0.0155*** 0.0018 0.0155*** 0.0018 0.0146** 0.0015 0.0150** 0.0015
(0.0027) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0061)
ACC -0.0180** -0.0293 -0.0034 -0.0293* -0.0034 -0.0649** -0.0068 -0.0672*** -0.0069
(0.0072) (0.0227) (0.0167) (0.0281) (0.0251)
Age 0.0310*** 0.1510*** 0.0174 0.1510*** 0.0174 0.1449*** 0.0152 0.1547*** 0.0160
(0.0040) (0.0219) (0.0191) (0.0229) (0.0546)
Expected wage 0.0032 0.0545* 0.0063 0.0545 0.0063 -0.0179 -0.0019 -0.0171 -0.0018
(0.0058) (0.0280) (0.0361) (0.0352) (0.0396)
Pensionable earnings 0.1067*** -0.1652*** -0.0190 -0.1652** -0.0190 0.1921** 0.0201 0.2000 0.0206
(0.0359) (0.0526) (0.0663) (0.0913) (0.1368)
North -0.0458 -0.0052 -0.0459 -0.0052 -0.0348 -0.0036 -0.0461 -0.0047
(0.1388) (0.1404) (0.1398) (0.1609)
Self-employed -0.5186*** -0.0538 -0.5187*** -0.0538 -0.5085** -0.0477 -0.5373** -0.0494
(0.1961) (0.1972) (0.2015) (0.2672)
Public worker 0.3426** 0.0433 0.3427* 0.0433 0.3970** 0.0463 0.4210* 0.0484
(0.1626) (0.1847) (0.1718) (0.2367)
White collar -0.3172** -0.0348 -0.3173* -0.0348 -0.4076** -0.0401 -0.4334* -0.0418
(0.1517) (0.1787) (0.1613) (0.2391)
Manager -0.5230* -0.0472 -0.5232** -0.0473 -0.4200 -0.0366 -0.4513 -0.0384
(0.2744) (0.2614) (0.2633) (0.3277)
N 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185
Rho 0.80 . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.04 0.04
Age dummies No No No No No No No No No
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 19: Estimates for retirement, females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0020 0.0164*** 0.0016 0.0164*** 0.0016 0.0153*** 0.0014 0.0153** 0.0014
(0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0061)
ACC -0.0122* -0.0350 -0.0034 -0.0350* -0.0034 -0.0702** -0.0065 -0.0702*** -0.0065
(0.0070) (0.0225) (0.0179) (0.0288) (0.0231)
Expected wage 0.0016 0.0570** 0.0055 0.0570 0.0055 -0.0137 -0.0013 -0.0137 -0.0013
(0.0057) (0.0265) (0.0359) (0.0293) (0.0400)
Pensionable earnings 0.0630** -0.1855*** -0.0180 -0.1855*** -0.0180 0.1592** 0.0147 0.1592 0.0147
(0.0293) (0.0451) (0.0680) (0.0796) (0.1305)
North 0.0113 0.0011 0.0113 0.0011 0.0061 0.0006 0.0061 0.0006
(0.1372) (0.1481) (0.1395) (0.1503)
Self-employed -0.3937** -0.0352 -0.3938* -0.0352 -0.4043** -0.0342 -0.4042* -0.0342
(0.1754) (0.2030) (0.1858) (0.2118)
Public worker 0.3732** 0.0405 0.3733* 0.0405 0.4190** 0.0435 0.4189** 0.0435
(0.1681) (0.1945) (0.1810) (0.2003)
White collar -0.4106*** -0.0373 -0.4107** -0.0373 -0.4884*** -0.0416 -0.4883** -0.0415
(0.1481) (0.1877) (0.1608) (0.1961)
Manager -0.4990* -0.0385 -0.4990* -0.0385 -0.3782 -0.0295 -0.3781 -0.0295
(0.2840) (0.2727) (0.2842) (0.2804)
N 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185
Rho 0.75 . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 20: Estimates for retirement, females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0055** 0.0164*** 0.0019 0.0164*** 0.0019 0.0128* 0.0013 0.0136* 0.0014
(0.0026) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0071)
PV -0.0114** -0.0131 -0.0015 -0.0131 -0.0015 -0.0492* -0.0052 -0.0566* -0.0057
(0.0045) (0.0164) (0.0157) (0.0290) (0.0318)
Age 0.0292*** 0.1482*** 0.0169 0.1482*** 0.0169 0.1369*** 0.0144 0.1634** 0.0164
(0.0041) (0.0220) (0.0192) (0.0229) (0.0778)
Expected wage 0.0025 0.0400* 0.0045 0.0400 0.0045 -0.0224 -0.0023 -0.0206 -0.0021
(0.0045) (0.0231) (0.0365) (0.0294) (0.0424)
Pensionable earnings 0.0728** -0.1525*** -0.0173 -0.1525** -0.0173 0.2294** 0.0241 0.2614 0.0261
(0.0320) (0.0510) (0.0660) (0.0975) (0.1723)
North -0.0393 -0.0044 -0.0393 -0.0044 -0.0269 -0.0028 -0.0596 -0.0059
(0.1386) (0.1398) (0.1401) (0.1867)
Self-employed -0.4779** -0.0493 -0.4778** -0.0493 -0.4170** -0.0399 -0.4873 -0.0440
(0.1932) (0.1955) (0.1989) (0.3221)
Public worker 0.3230** 0.0402 0.3230* 0.0402 0.3532** 0.0408 0.4171 0.0462
(0.1616) (0.1840) (0.1688) (0.2848)
White collar -0.3261** -0.0353 -0.3261* -0.0353 -0.4087** -0.0401 -0.4839 -0.0449
(0.1522) (0.1785) (0.1621) (0.3070)
Manager -0.5234* -0.0467 -0.5234** -0.0467 -0.4062 -0.0356 -0.4849 -0.0397
(0.2698) (0.2595) (0.2605) (0.3848)
N 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185
Rho 0.65 . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.12 0.12
Age dummies No No No No No No No No No
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 21: Estimates for retirement, females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Linear Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Fixed Effect Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW -0.0008 0.0176*** 0.0017 0.0176*** 0.0017 0.0149** 0.0014 0.0149** 0.0014
(0.0027) (0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0064)
PV -0.0071 -0.0135 -0.0013 -0.0135 -0.0013 -0.0410 -0.0038 -0.0410* -0.0038
(0.0046) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0291) (0.0247)
Expected wage 0.0005 0.0367* 0.0035 0.0367 0.0035 -0.0259 -0.0024 -0.0259 -0.0024
(0.0047) (0.0216) (0.0365) (0.0295) (0.0440)
Pensionable earnings 0.0404 -0.1685*** -0.0162 -0.1685** -0.0162 0.1811* 0.0168 0.1810 0.0168
(0.0256) (0.0469) (0.0681) (0.0950) (0.1386)
North 0.0176 0.0017 0.0176 0.0017 0.0158 0.0015 0.0159 0.0015
(0.1367) (0.1472) (0.1393) (0.1494)
Self-employed -0.3531** -0.0316 -0.3531* -0.0316 -0.3279* -0.0284 -0.3278 -0.0284
(0.1740) (0.2011) (0.1822) (0.2104)
Public worker 0.3502** 0.0374 0.3502* 0.0374 0.3680** 0.0381 0.3679* 0.0381
(0.1668) (0.1934) (0.1753) (0.1979)
White collar -0.4192*** -0.0378 -0.4193** -0.0378 -0.4884*** -0.0419 -0.4883** -0.0419
(0.1474) (0.1874) (0.1600) (0.1954)
Manager -0.5092* -0.0388 -0.5093* -0.0388 -0.3966 -0.0309 -0.3966 -0.0309
(0.2780) (0.2706) (0.2822) (0.2789)
N 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185 1,185
Rho 0.62 . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 22: Estimates for retirement, females
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0214** 0.0021 0.0214** 0.0021 0.0158* 0.0014 0.0158* 0.0014
(0.0097) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0088)
ACC -0.0290 -0.0028 -0.0290 -0.0028 -0.1533*** -0.0138 -0.1532*** -0.0138
(0.0250) (0.0221) (0.0450) (0.0446)
North -0.0385 -0.0038 -0.0385 -0.0038 -0.0082 -0.0007 -0.0082 -0.0007
(0.1817) (0.2032) (0.1912) (0.2186)
Expected wage 0.0441 0.0043 0.0441 0.0043 -0.3154*** -0.0285 -0.3154*** -0.0285
(0.0388) (0.0517) (0.1169) (0.0999)
Pensionable earnings -0.2102*** -0.0206 -0.2102** -0.0206 0.5102** 0.0461 0.5102* 0.0461
(0.0683) (0.0870) (0.2158) (0.2675)
Self-employed -0.6069** -0.0522 -0.6070** -0.0522 -0.4976 -0.0409 -0.4975* -0.0409
(0.2705) (0.2751) (0.3083) (0.2996)
Public worker 0.3741 0.0409 0.3742 0.0409 0.6083** 0.0643 0.6082** 0.0643
(0.2294) (0.2625) (0.2560) (0.2966)
White collar -0.4668** -0.0432 -0.4669* -0.0432 -0.5302** -0.0449 -0.5301* -0.0449
(0.2240) (0.2617) (0.2399) (0.2800)
Manager -0.5610 -0.0427 -0.5610 -0.0427 -0.3205 -0.0254 -0.3205 -0.0254
(0.3799) (0.3556) (0.3947) (0.3823)
Home owner -0.1475 -0.0133 -0.1475 -0.0133 -0.0728 -0.0063 -0.0728 -0.0063
(0.2379) (0.2174) (0.2576) (0.2341)
Housing wealth -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0035) (0.0002) (0.0031)
Stock 0.5856* 0.0718 0.5856* 0.0718 0.6566* 0.0742 0.6565* 0.0742
(0.3459) (0.3459) (0.3738) (0.3640)
Fund -0.3331 -0.0285 -0.3331 -0.0285 -0.4325 -0.0332 -0.4325 -0.0332
(0.3625) (0.4191) (0.3774) (0.4540)
Working spouse 0.0133 0.0013 0.0132 0.0013 -0.0528 -0.0046 -0.0528 -0.0046
(0.1938) (0.2030) (0.2083) (0.2171)
N 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 23: Estimates for retirement, females
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0209** 0.0020 0.0209** 0.0020 0.0159* 0.0014 0.0159* 0.0014
(0.0099) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0088)
PV -0.0291 -0.0028 -0.0291 -0.0028 -0.1260*** -0.0114 -0.1260*** -0.0114
(0.0242) (0.0211) (0.0457) (0.0400)
North -0.0371 -0.0036 -0.0371 -0.0036 -0.0227 -0.0020 -0.0226 -0.0020
(0.1829) (0.2034) (0.1955) (0.2166)
Expected wage 0.0481 0.0046 0.0481 0.0046 -0.2538** -0.0230 -0.2538*** -0.0230
(0.0413) (0.0529) (0.1061) (0.0980)
Pensionable earnings -0.2085*** -0.0201 -0.2084** -0.0201 0.3053 0.0276 0.3053 0.0276
(0.0686) (0.0879) (0.2180) (0.2657)
Self-employed -0.5704** -0.0487 -0.5702** -0.0487 -0.3737 -0.0314 -0.3736 -0.0314
(0.2758) (0.2736) (0.3046) (0.2923)
Public worker 0.3685 0.0396 0.3684 0.0395 0.5523** 0.0576 0.5523* 0.0576
(0.2289) (0.2630) (0.2516) (0.2917)
White collar -0.4593** -0.0418 -0.4592* -0.0418 -0.4977** -0.0424 -0.4976* -0.0424
(0.2272) (0.2635) (0.2421) (0.2803)
Manager -0.5628 -0.0422 -0.5627 -0.0422 -0.3171 -0.0252 -0.3171 -0.0252
(0.3808) (0.3548) (0.3890) (0.3774)
Home owner -0.1499 -0.0133 -0.1499 -0.0133 -0.0588 -0.0052 -0.0587 -0.0052
(0.2374) (0.2179) (0.2546) (0.2337)
Housing wealth -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0034) (0.0002) (0.0032)
Stock 0.5901* 0.0716 0.5900* 0.0716 0.6554* 0.0741 0.6553* 0.0741
(0.3432) (0.3456) (0.3627) (0.3601)
Fund -0.3421 -0.0287 -0.3420 -0.0287 -0.4478 -0.0343 -0.4477 -0.0343
(0.3637) (0.4179) (0.3759) (0.4442)
Working spouse 0.0212 0.0021 0.0212 0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0002
(0.1949) (0.2023) (0.2111) (0.2131)
N 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 24: Estimates for retirement, females
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0157*** 0.0015 0.0157*** 0.0015 0.0142** 0.0013 0.0142** 0.0013
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0062)
ACC -0.0340 -0.0032 -0.0340* -0.0032 -0.0663** -0.0060 -0.0663*** -0.0060
(0.0219) (0.0183) (0.0292) (0.0236)
North 0.0746 0.0072 0.0746 0.0072 0.0640 0.0059 0.0640 0.0059
(0.1359) (0.1526) (0.1379) (0.1542)
Expected wage 0.0599** 0.0057 0.0599 0.0057 -0.0133 -0.0012 -0.0133 -0.0012
(0.0265) (0.0383) (0.0307) (0.0416)
Pensionable earnings -0.1844*** -0.0175 -0.1844*** -0.0175 0.1343 0.0122 0.1342 0.0122
(0.0449) (0.0704) (0.0834) (0.1370)
Self-employed -0.4608** -0.0401 -0.4607** -0.0401 -0.4326** -0.0360 -0.4325* -0.0360
(0.2108) (0.2246) (0.2196) (0.2354)
Public worker 0.3077* 0.0320 0.3076 0.0320 0.3570* 0.0359 0.3569* 0.0359
(0.1772) (0.1979) (0.1906) (0.2048)
White collar -0.4622*** -0.0410 -0.4621** -0.0410 -0.4991*** -0.0420 -0.4990** -0.0420
(0.1592) (0.2089) (0.1705) (0.2194)
Manager -0.4857 -0.0372 -0.4856 -0.0372 -0.3196 -0.0253 -0.3196 -0.0253
(0.3066) (0.3109) (0.3155) (0.3304)
Ill after 50 0.2287 0.0243 0.2286 0.0243 0.1275 0.0123 0.1275 0.0123
(0.2088) (0.2561) (0.1961) (0.2658)
Control 0.0309 0.0030 0.0309 0.0030 -0.0360 -0.0032 -0.0359 -0.0032
(0.1767) (0.1888) (0.1888) (0.2008)
Effort 0.0959 0.0096 0.0958 0.0096 0.1028 0.0099 0.1028 0.0099
(0.1603) (0.1574) (0.1654) (0.1604)
Reward 0.3800** 0.0444 0.3800** 0.0444 0.3695** 0.0409 0.3695** 0.0409
(0.1718) (0.1706) (0.1787) (0.1733)
N 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
62
Table 25: Estimates for retirement, females
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0169*** 0.0016 0.0169*** 0.0016 0.0143** 0.0013 0.0143** 0.0013
(0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0065)
PV -0.0123 -0.0012 -0.0123 -0.0012 -0.0350 -0.0032 -0.0350 -0.0032
(0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0277) (0.0246)
North 0.0806 0.0077 0.0806 0.0077 0.0750 0.0069 0.0750 0.0069
(0.1358) (0.1517) (0.1384) (0.1532)
Expected wage 0.0382* 0.0036 0.0382 0.0036 -0.0260 -0.0024 -0.0260 -0.0024
(0.0216) (0.0388) (0.0306) (0.0455)
Pensionable earnings -0.1652*** -0.0156 -0.1652** -0.0156 0.1447 0.0133 0.1447 0.0133
(0.0469) (0.0699) (0.0939) (0.1421)
Self-employed -0.4107** -0.0357 -0.4106* -0.0357 -0.3516* -0.0299 -0.3515 -0.0299
(0.2073) (0.2206) (0.2127) (0.2320)
Public worker 0.2849 0.0292 0.2848 0.0292 0.3040* 0.0304 0.3040 0.0304
(0.1769) (0.1970) (0.1840) (0.2022)
White collar -0.4636*** -0.0407 -0.4635** -0.0407 -0.4883*** -0.0414 -0.4883** -0.0414
(0.1590) (0.2079) (0.1681) (0.2183)
Manager -0.4816 -0.0367 -0.4815 -0.0367 -0.3208 -0.0255 -0.3208 -0.0255
(0.2995) (0.3072) (0.3093) (0.3278)
Ill after 50 0.2558 0.0274 0.2558 0.0274 0.2005 0.0202 0.2005 0.0202
(0.2209) (0.2528) (0.2106) (0.2572)
Control 0.0104 0.0010 0.0104 0.0010 -0.0544 -0.0048 -0.0543 -0.0048
(0.1774) (0.1870) (0.1886) (0.1986)
Effort 0.0899 0.0089 0.0898 0.0089 0.0930 0.0090 0.0930 0.0090
(0.1593) (0.1565) (0.1648) (0.1593)
Reward 0.3843** 0.0448 0.3843** 0.0448 0.3640** 0.0406 0.3639** 0.0406
(0.1717) (0.1700) (0.1771) (0.1726)
N 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 26: Estimates for retirement, females
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0223** 0.0022 0.0223** 0.0022 0.0181* 0.0016 0.0181* 0.0016
(0.0104) (0.0095) (0.0093) (0.0093)
ACC -0.0269 -0.0026 -0.0269 -0.0026 -0.1506*** -0.0136 -0.1506*** -0.0136
(0.0237) (0.0225) (0.0473) (0.0458)
North 0.0219 0.0021 0.0219 0.0021 0.0757 0.0069 0.0757 0.0069
(0.1717) (0.2220) (0.1860) (0.2350)
Expected wage 0.0437 0.0042 0.0437 0.0042 -0.3316*** -0.0299 -0.3316*** -0.0299
(0.0383) (0.0556) (0.1241) (0.1054)
Pensionable earnings -0.2327*** -0.0226 -0.2327** -0.0226 0.4803** 0.0433 0.4803* 0.0433
(0.0784) (0.0981) (0.2226) (0.2633)
Self-employed -0.6257** -0.0533 -0.6257** -0.0533 -0.4283 -0.0355 -0.4284 -0.0355
(0.2801) (0.2950) (0.3103) (0.3268)
Public worker 0.3732 0.0401 0.3731 0.0401 0.6372** 0.0672 0.6372** 0.0672
(0.2505) (0.2702) (0.3006) (0.3091)
White collar -0.4957** -0.0451 -0.4957* -0.0451 -0.5046* -0.0426 -0.5046* -0.0426
(0.2449) (0.2827) (0.2677) (0.2989)
Manager -0.5364 -0.0414 -0.5364 -0.0414 -0.1119 -0.0097 -0.1119 -0.0097
(0.4313) (0.4225) (0.4586) (0.4776)
Home owner -0.1730 -0.0153 -0.1731 -0.0153 -0.0888 -0.0077 -0.0888 -0.0077
(0.2787) (0.2528) (0.2815) (0.2473)
Housing wealth -0.0061 -0.0006 -0.0061 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0766) (0.1004) (0.0003) (0.0055)
Stock 0.4612 0.0530 0.4612 0.0530 0.5887 0.0641 0.5887 0.0641
(0.3579) (0.3743) (0.3924) (0.3984)
Fund -0.2071 -0.0185 -0.2071 -0.0185 -0.3988 -0.0311 -0.3988 -0.0311
(0.4470) (0.4718) (0.4627) (0.4889)
Working spouse 0.0057 0.0006 0.0057 0.0006 -0.0363 -0.0032 -0.0363 -0.0032
(0.1973) (0.2147) (0.2184) (0.2280)
Ill after 50 -0.0219 -0.0021 -0.0219 -0.0021 -0.1713 -0.0144 -0.1713 -0.0144
(0.2260) (0.3423) (0.2418) (0.3701)
Control -0.0265 -0.0025 -0.0265 -0.0025 -0.2431 -0.0195 -0.2431 -0.0195
(0.2538) (0.2580) (0.2652) (0.2941)
Effort 0.0059 0.0006 0.0059 0.0006 0.0017 0.0002 0.0017 0.0002
(0.2190) (0.2180) (0.2559) (0.2355)
Reward 0.5420** 0.0692 0.5420** 0.0692 0.6105** 0.0725 0.6106** 0.0725
(0.2577) (0.2375) (0.2800) (0.2543)
N 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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Table 27: Estimates for retirement, females
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit CRE Probit CRE Probit
Estimation Method Pooled MLE MLE Pooled MLE MLE
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
SSW 0.0218** 0.0021 0.0218** 0.0021 0.0178* 0.0016 0.0178* 0.0016
(0.0105) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0094)
PV -0.0277 -0.0027 -0.0278 -0.0027 -0.1268*** -0.0117 -0.1268*** -0.0117
(0.0231) (0.0212) (0.0451) (0.0410)
North 0.0245 0.0024 0.0245 0.0024 0.0532 0.0049 0.0532 0.0049
(0.1727) (0.2224) (0.1903) (0.2336)
Expected wage 0.0494 0.0048 0.0494 0.0048 -0.2681** -0.0247 -0.2681*** -0.0247
(0.0409) (0.0577) (0.1105) (0.1031)
Pensionable earnings -0.2336*** -0.0226 -0.2336** -0.0226 0.2642 0.0244 0.2642 0.0244
(0.0793) (0.1003) (0.2184) (0.2665)
Self-employed -0.5867** -0.0502 -0.5867** -0.0502 -0.2786 -0.0243 -0.2786 -0.0243
(0.2908) (0.2925) (0.3210) (0.3202)
Public worker 0.3706 0.0396 0.3706 0.0396 0.5924** 0.0629 0.5925* 0.0629
(0.2508) (0.2711) (0.2985) (0.3060)
White collar -0.4917** -0.0446 -0.4917* -0.0446 -0.4659* -0.0404 -0.4659 -0.0404
(0.2472) (0.2849) (0.2735) (0.3006)
Manager -0.5419 -0.0416 -0.5419 -0.0416 -0.0978 -0.0087 -0.0978 -0.0087
(0.4301) (0.4219) (0.4480) (0.4725)
Home owner -0.1797 -0.0158 -0.1797 -0.0158 -0.0765 -0.0068 -0.0765 -0.0068
(0.2763) (0.2528) (0.2788) (0.2470)
Housing wealth -0.0039 -0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0769) (0.1010) (0.0004) (0.0062)
Stock 0.4618 0.0529 0.4618 0.0529 0.5725 0.0633 0.5725 0.0633
(0.3578) (0.3748) (0.3894) (0.3972)
Fund -0.2100 -0.0187 -0.2100 -0.0187 -0.3751 -0.0302 -0.3751 -0.0302
(0.4484) (0.4711) (0.4664) (0.4851)
Working spouse 0.0126 0.0012 0.0126 0.0012 0.0101 0.0009 0.0101 0.0009
(0.1994) (0.2139) (0.2223) (0.2253)
Ill after 50 -0.0255 -0.0024 -0.0255 -0.0024 -0.1699 -0.0146 -0.1699 -0.0146
(0.2269) (0.3417) (0.2436) (0.3667)
Control -0.0240 -0.0023 -0.0241 -0.0023 -0.2527 -0.0206 -0.2527 -0.0206
(0.2546) (0.2578) (0.2680) (0.2938)
Effort 0.0119 0.0012 0.0119 0.0012 0.0367 0.0034 0.0367 0.0034
(0.2188) (0.2187) (0.2522) (0.2345)
Reward 0.5451** 0.0693 0.5452** 0.0693 0.6407** 0.0783 0.6408** 0.0783
(0.2571) (0.2376) (0.2778) (0.2545)
N 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698
Rho . . 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 0.00
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: monetary values in 2011 Euro. SSW and MI are divided by 10000, House Value is divided by 100000. s.e. in round brackets.
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9 Conclusion
This paper estimates a structural reduced form of the Option Value model
of retirement behaviour first developed by Stock and Wise (1990). This
model has the advantage of taking into account both current and future re-
tirement wealth accruals. By imposing parameter values and using social
security wealth and financial marginal incentive measures as explanatory
variables in a reduced form version model of retirement, the assess the
participation response to the incentives embedded in the Social Security
system may be assessed.
The model is estimated using the Italian data of the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which offer offer great ad-
vantages over previous research in at least three aspects. After controlling
for a number of significant individual and job characteristics, as well as
for the potential correlation of incentives and unobserved individual ef-
fects (by using a Correlated Random Effect model), results suggest that
workers are responsive to the financial incentives embedded in the Italian
social security system. Results also suggest that unobserved heterogene-
ity is small and not significant, and it totally disappears when many in-
dividuals and job characteristics are controlled for, meaning that there is
sufficient information to explain heterogeneity among individuals.
This is important for policy and efficiency reasons. If unobserved char-
acteristics were important, it would be more difficult to define an optimal
(from a social welfare point of view) age of retirement, and individuals -
under the assumption that they know their own characteristics, like taste
for work or productivity, better than the social planner - should be left freer
to choose when to retire. This could reduce choice distortions and improve
efficiency, avoiding for example the losses in productivity that could arise
either by keeping unproductive workers at work or by inducing to retire
workers who are still productive. However, the fact that observable char-
acteristics of individuals seems important to explain retirement, given cer-
tain incentives, suggests that these characteristics could be used to adjust
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the incentives embedded in the social security system as a way to improve
the efficiency of the social security system.
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